



What’s So Reasonable About Reasonableness?  
Rejecting a Case Law-Centered Approach to Title 
VII’s Reasonable Belief Doctrine 
By Matthew W. Green Jr. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Laura and her husband Jamal met while working for their employer, 
Octogon, Inc.  Laura is white and Jamal is black.  One day over lunch in the 
company break room, another employee, Joe Simmons, asked Laura whether 
she exclusively dated white guys.  Laura told Joe, who is also white, that she 
previously had dated white men, but that she fell in love with and married 
Jamal.  Joe responded that he would never date a black person because he 
“could not stand listening to them complain about slavery.”  Moreover, 
during their conversation, he repeatedly used the word “nigger” and told 
Laura that he did not understand why blacks could use the word “nigger” 
while he could not.  He assured her that he was not racist but that he “just 
really did not like blacks.”  He said that he felt lucky that he did not have 
any black blood in him because if he did, he would have “to scrape that shit 
off.”  Laura became offended and told Joe about her displeasure.  Although 
Joe apologized, Laura thought Joe’s behavior was inappropriate and violated 
company policy.  Octogon’s employee handbook contained prohibitions on 
discriminatory conduct in the workplace.  The handbook provided that 
Octogon “did not tolerate discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, 
marital status, or any other characteristic protected by law” and directed 
employees to report “any perceived discriminatory conduct” to human 
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resources.  Pursuant to the handbook, Laura reported the lunchtime incident.  
Subsequently, Laura’s workload and pay were cut.  She was also told that 
she could not “mingle” with Jamal on company time, although other couples 
were allowed to associate at work.  Laura filed a lawsuit under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), alleging she was retaliated against 
for complaining about what she perceived to be race discrimination, 
particularly that Joe’s conduct amounted to a form of racial harassment.  The 
court, however, determined that under circuit precedent the incident with Joe 
did not amount to a legally cognizable racial harassment claim under Title 
VII.  Should Laura’s retaliation claim fail as a result?
1
 
This article addresses the issue raised by the aforementioned 
hypothetical, a common one under Title VII and other federal employment 
discrimination statutes.  Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision protects 
individuals who oppose “any practice made an unlawful employment 
practice” by Title VII.
2
  Lower federal courts have consistently held that, 
literally read, the provision protects only workers who oppose practices that 
are proven to be actually unlawful under the statute.
3
  Such a reading would 
doom Laura’s retaliation claim.  Because that interpretation of the statute 
might deter employees from bringing possible discrimination to their 
employer’s attention, courts uniformly have held that employees challenging 
alleged discrimination do not have to show that the underlying 
discriminatory practice reported is actually unlawful.
4
  Rather, the employee 
only has to show that when she complained, at a minimum, she held an 
objectively reasonable belief that the challenged action was unlawful.
5
  This 
standard makes sense in theory.  If the law were clear that employers could 
discriminate against employees unless they had a perfect understanding of 
Title VII law, employees would have good reason to keep quiet about 
potential discrimination.  Broad protection from retaliation is warranted 
because employees should be encouraged to bring potential discrimination to 
                                                          
 1.  The hypothetical represents a composite of court decisions involving Title VII retaliation 
claims.  See Robinson v. Cavalry Portfolio Servs., LLC, 365 F. App’x 104, 107–10, (10th Cir. 2010) 
(reversing jury verdict in favor of plaintiff, a white woman married to a black man, who alleged 
retaliation after complaining about a coworker’s racially discriminatory remarks, where the 
coworker knew that her husband was African-American); Jordan v. Alt. Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 
337, 350 (4th Cir. 2006) (affirming motion to dismiss plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim, where he 
alleged that he was fired after reporting remarks the court labeled as being “crude” and “racist” and 
despite the fact that the employer’s policy manual required that he report “any perceived” 
discrimination). 
 2.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).  
 3.  See discussion infra Part II.B.1.b. 
 4.  See infra notes 49–51 and accompanying discussion. 
 5.  See infra note 50 and accompanying discussion. 
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the attention of employers for informal resolution.  For this reason, the 
Supreme Court has consistently interpreted Title VII in a manner that 
recognizes the importance of informal dispute resolution.
6
  Requiring an 




Although the reasonable belief doctrine is sound in theory, its 
application has become problematic to plaintiffs challenging discrimination.  
The Supreme Court has decided a number of retaliation cases in recent 
years,
8
 yet has failed to define the reasonable belief doctrine despite the 
frequency with which the issue arises in the federal courts.
9
  This Article 
examines the origins and purposes of the reasonable belief doctrine, and 
demonstrates how recent application of the doctrine undermines those 
purposes.  It then proposes remedying those issues by re-conceptualizing the 
reasonable belief doctrine to broaden its scope of protection. 
A principal concern with the reasonable belief doctrine involves the 
narrow manner in which reasonableness is determined.  Similar to Laura’s 
case set forth above, in many instances, whether an employee’s belief about 
the illegality of a challenged practice is deemed reasonable is based only on 
the facts surrounding the conduct about which the plaintiff complains and on 
the current substantive law.
10
  Under this approach, the litmus test for 
reasonableness is case law.  Employees are given no leeway to be wrong 
about judicial interpretations of Title VII.  Indeed, employees have been 
required to understand circuit splits and how the particular court hearing the 
                                                          
 6.  See discussion infra Part II.B.2.a. 
 7.  See id. 
 8.  The Court has recently addressed Title VII retaliation claims in a number of decisions.  See, 
e.g., Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2522–23 (2013) (holding that Title 
VII’s anti-retaliation provision requires something less than but-for causation); Thompson v. N. Am. 
Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 870 (2011) (holding that third-party retaliation claims are cognizable 
under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision); Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson 
Cnty. Tenn., 555 U.S. 271, 271 (2009) (resolving circuit split regarding whether an employee is 
protected under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision for not only speaking out about discrimination 
on her own initiative, but also “in answering questions during an employer’s internal investigation” 
into potential discrimination); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006) 
(resolving circuit split that had developed regarding two issues: whether Title VII’s anti-retaliation 
provision confined “actionable retaliation to activity that affects the terms and conditions of 
employment” and “how harmful . . . the adverse actions [must] be to fall within its scope”); 
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 339 (1997) (resolving circuit split regarding whether Title 
VII’s anti-retaliation provision protects current as well as former employees of an employer). 
 9.  The reasonable belief doctrine arises with frequency in the federal courts.  In 2013, a 
Westlaw search of federal district court cases yielded more than 1,000 cases referencing the 
reasonable belief doctrine.  The Supreme Court, however, has not yet decided the propriety of this 
standard.  See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 10.  See infra discussion Part III.  
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plaintiff’s claim has interpreted Title VII.
11
  Thus, employee beliefs about 
illegal discrimination have been held to be unreasonable even where legal 
support for such a belief exists based on another court’s holding.
12
 
Under this “case-law litmus test,” before a plaintiff may complain about 
discrimination and receive protection against retaliation for that complaint, 
she first would have to seek legal counsel to ascertain whether the 
complained-of conduct violates discrimination law.
13
  She is mistaken at her 
own peril.  Commenting on the stringency of the reasonable belief doctrine, 
Professors Deborah Brake and Joanna Grossman have explained that 
employees who have a “near-perfect understanding . . . of current 
discrimination law” may be protected for complaining about alleged 
discrimination, but “[e]mployees who do not meet this ideal take a grave 
risk . . . .”
14
  For that reason, another commentator has called the reasonable 
belief doctrine “[p]erhaps the most significant limitation to coverage under 
the opposition clause” of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision.
15
 
This Article argues that the case-law litmus test approach to 
reasonableness is as problematic an interpretation of Title VII’s anti-
retaliation provision as conditioning protection on proof that the practice an 
employee opposed was actually unlawful.  The latter approach has been, 
and, as argued here, should be rejected because to do otherwise would deter 
complaints and undermine the purposes and goals of the statute.
16
  The case-
law litmus test raises the same concerns.
17
  Although plaintiffs are not 
required to prove a practice is actually unlawful, commentators argue, and 
the case law demonstrates, that to meet the reasonableness standard plaintiffs 
must be able to survive a motion for summary judgment on the underlying 
claim.
18
  In other words, a plaintiff’s belief is reasonable if she can 
demonstrate that the complained-of conduct would be sufficient to permit a 
jury to rule in her favor under existing law.  This standard is obviously 
problematic.  Unlike a lay employee challenging discrimination in the 
workplace, a juror determining whether discrimination has occurred is 
armed both with facts the employee may not have known at the time of her 
                                                          
 11.  See infra discussion Part III.C.3. 
 12.  See id. 
 13.  See id. 
 14.  Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII As a Rights-Claiming 
Statute, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 913 (2008). 
 15.  Alex B. Long, The Troublemaker’s Friend: Retaliation Against Third Parties and the Right 
of Association in the Workplace, 59 FLA. L. REV. 931, 955  (2007). 
 16.  See discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
 17.  See discussion infra Part III.C.1–3. 
 18.  See discussion infra Part III.C.1 and accompanying notes. 
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complaint and with a detailed explanation of applicable law.
19
 
The concerns raised by the reasonable belief doctrine have led 
commentators to argue for its rejection in favor of a purely subjective good 
faith standard.
20
  Under that standard, an employee would be protected from 
retaliation if she had a subjective, honest belief that the complained-of 
practice violated Title VII.  For reasons explained later, this Article does not 
disagree that a subjective standard would be preferable to one requiring 
reasonableness in light of existing case law.  This Article, however, does 
question whether a purely subjective standard is practical considering recent 
precedent from the Supreme Court, which shows a preference for using 
objective factors when interpreting Title VII.  In Burlington Northern & 
Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White,
21
 the Court both emphasized the need for 
broad protection from retaliation for effective enforcement of Title VII and 
reaffirmed its commitment to using objective standards when interpreting 
the statute, including the anti-retaliation provision.
22
  Although Burlington 
Northern did not address the propriety of the reasonable belief standard, the 
Court’s analysis in that case is predictive of the approach it might take on 
this issue. 
This Article, therefore, does not outright reject reasonableness or 
objective standards.  It seeks instead to expand the concept of 
reasonableness for purposes of the reasonable belief doctrine.  This Article 
offers a middle ground between the purely subjective approach scholars 
have advocated and the purely objective approach of the case-law litmus 
test.  It argues for a reasonableness standard that considers the totality of the 
circumstances, including tangible factors—those beyond case law—that may 
influence an employee’s belief.  No one factor would be determinative in a 
                                                          
 19.  See, e.g., Palmer v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys., 208 F.3d 969, 975 (11th Cir. 2000) (“In 
examining a trial court’s formulation of jury instructions, we apply a deferential standard, looking at 
the instructions as a whole ‘to determine whether they fairly and adequately addressed the issue and 
correctly stated the law.’” (citations omitted)); Farley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197 F.3d 1322, 
1330–31 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding the trial court did not err in instructing the jury in a claim arising 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), as the instructions were taken from the pattern 
jury instructions and “accurately reflected” the court’s case law on the definition of “qualified 
individual[] with a disability”). 
 20.  See, e.g., Lawrence D. Rosenthal, To Report or Not to Report: The Case for Eliminating 
the Objectively Reasonable Requirement for Opposition Activities Under Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation 
Provision, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1127, 1129 n.7, 1129–30 (2007) (noting that every appellate court has 
adopted the reasonableness standard,  detailing the flaws with the standard, and arguing that it 
should be replaced by a good faith standard); Brianne J. Gorod, Rejecting “Reasonableness”: A New 
Look at Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1469, 1473 (2007) (arguing for 
protection unless plaintiff has acted in bad faith). 
 21.  548 U.S. 53 (2006). 
 22.  Id. at 62–69. 
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totality of the circumstances reasonableness calculus.  Such a test is a logical 
extension of existing precedent interpreting Title VII and is consistent with 
the Court’s approach to interpreting the statute.
23
  Under such a test, factors 
that may be relevant to a belief about the illegality of an employment 
practice include the fundamental characteristics of the plaintiff (such as race 
and sex) that might influence her perception about whether the conduct is 
discriminatory, as well as employer representations about the scope of 
discrimination protections under the law.  Certainly, how an employer 
defines discrimination may shape an employee’s reasonable understanding 
of it.  The totality of the circumstances approach advocated here is not only 
consistent with the Court’s approach to reasonableness under Title VII, but 
also better effectuates the goal the Court recognized in Burlington Northern 
and other recent retaliation decisions: to provide workers with broad 
protection from retaliation so that they are not dissuaded from reporting 
alleged discrimination—a first step to remedying it. 
Part II of this Article examines the scope of protection under Title VII’s 
anti-retaliation provision and addresses the impetus for the reasonable belief 
doctrine.  It demonstrates that courts have relied correctly on numerous 
policy reasons to justify adoption of the reasonable belief standard.  Part III 
examines recent criticism of the reasonable belief doctrine among legal 
commentators.  It demonstrates that because of the stringency of its 
application, particularly the case-law litmus test approach to reasonableness, 
the reasonable belief doctrine raises the same concerns that led to its 
adoption.  Part IV argues for abandoning the case-law litmus test in 
assessing reasonableness, and explains why a good faith belief subjective 
standard, although preferable to current standards, is inconsistent with the 
approach the Court has taken in interpreting Title VII.  Finally, it proposes a 
new totality of the circumstances reasonableness test that should provide 
greater protection against workplace retaliation than is provided under the 
case law approach and that better effectuates the purposes of Title VII. 
II. TITLE VII’S ANTI-RETALIATION PROVISION: DEFINING THE SCOPE 
OF PROTECTION 
Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision in pertinent part provides: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to 
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for 
employment . . . [1] because he has opposed any practice made an 
                                                          
 23.  See discussion infra Part II.B.2.c. 
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unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or [2] because he has 
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an 
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].
24
 
As is clear from the language above, Title VII’s anti-retaliation 
provision contains two clauses relevant to the protected activity inquiry: the 
opposition clause and the participation clause.
25
  The scope of protection 
under the clauses differs. 
A. Participation Clause 
It is generally recognized that the participation clause affords broader 
protection than the opposition clause,
26
 in part because participation activity 
occurs in the context of formal proceedings.  Although the Supreme Court 
has yet to weigh in on the matter, courts that have decided the issue have 
held that the participation clause protects employees for activities that occur 
in conjunction with, or after the filing of, a formal charge of discrimination 
with the EEOC or an analogous state agency.
27
 
                                                          
 24.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 25.  See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2525 (2013) (explaining that 
Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision protects “the employee’s opposition to employment 
discrimination, and the employee’s submission of or support for a complaint that alleges 
employment discrimination”). 
 26.  See Deravin v. Kerik, 335 F.3d 195, 203, 203 n.6 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that the opposition 
clause is narrower than the participation clause and that courts have held that the participation 
clause, which protects participation in any manner, “is expansive and seemingly contains no 
limitations”); Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1312 (6th Cir. 1989) 
(recognizing that “courts have generally granted less protection for opposition than for participation 
in enforcement proceedings”); Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 
1978) (“The opposition clause . . . serves a more limited purpose [than the participation clause].”). 
 27.  See, e.g., Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson Cnty. Tenn., 555 U.S. 271, 
275, 280 (2009) (declining to address Sixth Circuit holding that participation clause applies only 
upon filing of a discrimination complaint with the EEOC); EEOC v. Total Sys. Servs. Inc., 221 F.3d 
1171, 1174 n.2 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[S]ome employee must file a charge with the EEOC (or its 
designated representative) or otherwise instigate proceedings under the statute for the conduct to 
come under the participation clause.”); Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 581 (6th Cir. 
2000) (noting that to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the participation clause, 
plaintiff must show that “he filed a claim with the EEOC”); Booker, 879 F.2d at 1313 (holding that 
the participation clause applies when administrative proceedings are instituted and lead to the filing 
of a complaint or charge, and this includes a visit to a government agency to inquire about filing a 
charge); Aguilar v. Arthritis Osteoporosis Ctr., No. M-03-243, 2006 WL 2478476, at *6 (S.D. Tex. 
Aug. 25, 2006) (collecting cases).  In some courts, informing one’s employer of an intent to file a 
charge also implicates the participation clause.  Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 680 (9th Cir. 
1997) (plaintiff’s act of informing her employer about her intent was sufficient to trigger the 
participation clause).  Participation in an employer’s internal investigation into allegations of 
discrimination conducted apart from a formal charge filed with an administrative agency does not 
typically fall within the scope of participation clause protection.  See Aguilar, 2006 WL 2478476, at 
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The participation clause offers broad protection from retaliation to 
ensure that employers cannot coerce employees into foregoing the Title VII 
grievance procedure and to ensure that EEOC investigators will have access 
to the unchilled testimony of witnesses.
28
  The EEOC principally relies on 
employees who are willing to file charges of discrimination with the agency 
to bring alleged discrimination to its attention.
29
  Because the EEOC—the 
agency Congress created to enforce Title VII—depends primarily on the 
charge alleging discrimination to function, it is imperative that employees 
feel free to file charges with the EEOC about perceived discrimination 
without fear of retaliation.  Accordingly, protection under the participation 
clause is necessarily broad because it is “essential to the machinery set up by 
Title VII” to root out and eliminate workplace discrimination.
30
 
That Congress intended the participation clause to offer broad protection 
is also reflected in its language.  The clause protects employees or applicants 
from discrimination if they have “participated in any manner in” a Title VII 
action.
31
  The phrase “in any manner” has been interpreted liberally or at 
least expansively by most courts.
32
  While authority on the issue is split, 
many courts hold that an employee is protected even if the charge lacks 
merit or contains allegations that are wrong, defamatory or malicious.
33
 
                                                                                                                       
 
*6–7 (collecting cases). 
 28.  See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006) (explaining 
the need for a broad interpretation of the participation clause because the statute’s effectiveness 
depends on “employees who are willing to file complaints and act as witnesses,” and employees 
must feel “free to approach officials with their grievances” (citations omitted)). 
 29.  See Joseph Kattan, Employee Opposition to Discriminatory Employment Practices: 
Protection From Reprisal Under Title VII, 19 WM. & MARY L. REV. 217, 226–27 (1977) (“Because 
the EEOC, with certain exceptions, investigates allegations of [discrimination] only upon the filing 
of a charge with the EEOC by or on behalf of an aggrieved party, the agency relies on individual 
initiative as a significant aid to enforcement.”). 
 30.  Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airport Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 259 n.4 (4th Cir. 1998). See also 
Kattan, supra note 29, at 224 (“Congress created an elaborate statutory framework, administered by 
the EEOC, that was designed to eliminate employment discrimination.”). 
 31.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (emphasis added).  See also Laughlin, 149 F.3d at 259; 
Booker, 879 F.2d at 1312 (“The ‘exceptionally broad protection’ of the participation clause extends 
to persons who have ‘participated in any manner’ in Title VII proceedings.” (citations omitted)). 
 32.  See, e.g., Booker, 879 F.2d at 1312 (6th Cir. 1989) (applying broad interpretation of “in any 
manner”). 
 33.  Booker, 879 F.2d at 1312 (citing Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1007 
(5th Cir. 1969)).  See also Deravin v. Kerik, 335 F.3d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 2003) (allowing for 
protection where plaintiff’s complaint was inaccurate due to what he claimed was administrative 
error); Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1978) (participation clause 
shields an employee from retaliation even if the charge lacks any merit); Pettway, 411 F.2d at 1005–
07 (explaining that because of the purposes underlying the participation clause, employees filing 
charges with EEOC deserve broad protection from retaliation even if the charge contains allegations 
that later proved to be untrue or malicious); Booth v. Pasco Cnty., 829 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1200–01 
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That the participation clause protects individuals from retaliation 
regardless of the merits of the charge is also implied by the statute’s 
enforcement provision.  Under that provision, Congress left it to the EEOC 
and not employees to establish the merit of a charge.  After a charge is filed, 
the statute directs the EEOC, among other things, to conduct an investigation 
of the charge to determine whether there is “reasonable cause” to believe the 
charge is true.
34
  In conducting its investigation to make that determination, 
the EEOC’s authority is broad.  It may, among other things, copy evidence 
in the possession of the employer, interview employees, issue subpoenas and 
seek judicial enforcement of those subpoenas.
35
  It seems obvious that an 
employee who suspects discrimination has occurred, yet has none of the 
investigative tools that are at the EEOC’s disposal, should be able to file a 
charge with the agency with some measure of protection without knowing if 
the charge has merit.  The Supreme Court has recognized as much, 
explaining that under Title VII “an aggrieved private party” is not “held to 
any prescribed level of objectively verifiable suspicion at the outset of the 
enforcement procedure. . . . [T]he determination whether there [is] any basis 
to the[] allegations of discrimination [is] postponed until after the 
Commission ha[s] completed its inquiries.”
36
 
Thus, the lower courts have been correct to protect employees from 
retaliation under the participation clause regardless of the merits of a charge.  
The scope of protection under the opposition clause, however, has been 
heavily debated and is less clear from the statute’s text. 
                                                                                                                       
 
(M.D. Fla. 2011) (declining to read a good faith and reasonableness requirement into the 
participation clause in light of Pettway, which declined any such standard, and cataloguing the 
weight of authority that has been “sympathetic to the Pettway rule”); Ayala v. Summit Constructors, 
Inc., 788 F. Supp. 2d 703, 721 (M.D. Tenn. 2011) (recognizing that courts are split on the issue of a 
good faith, reasonable standard under the participation clause, and declining to adopt such a 
standard).  But see Mattson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 359 F.3d 885, 890–91 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that 
claims that are baseless or lacking good faith do not deserve protection under the participation 
clause); Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 341 (3d Cir. 2006) (suggesting that under either the 
opposition or participation clause, to be protected from retaliation, a plaintiff “must hold an 
objectively reasonable belief, in good faith, that the activity [he] oppose[s] is unlawful under Title 
VII” (citation omitted)). 
 34.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2006). 
 35.  Id. § 2000e-8(b).  The EEOC has all the powers conferred upon the National Labor 
Relations Board to determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe the charge has merit.  See 
id. § 2000e-9 (noting that in the context of its investigations, the EEOC has the authority set forth in 
29 U.S.C. § 161, which grants the NLRB its authority). 
 36.  EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 76–77 (1984) (emphasis added).  Although the Court 
did not say so, it would appear from the context of the statement that the Court meant that an 
employee is not required to hold a reasonable basis that the charge has merit when it is filed, as that 
is for the EEOC to determine.  See id. 
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B. Opposition Clause 
Complaints about discrimination that are not made in conjunction with 
an EEOC charge are protected, if at all, under the opposition clause.  The 
clause is generally considered to protect employees who complain 
informally about discrimination by, for instance, raising the issue of alleged 
discrimination directly with an employer.
37
  The opposition clause is worded 
more narrowly than the participation clause.  Unlike its sister clause, it does 
not protect employees who oppose unlawful discrimination in any manner.
38
  
Congress arguably intended to place some limits on the circumstances in 
which employees are protected for protesting alleged discriminatory 
practices in the workplace.  However, neither the statute’s text nor its 
legislative history indicates how far protection should extend.
39
  It left that 
task to the courts.
40
 
1. Conditioning Protected Opposition 
a. The Manner in Which Opposition Is Expressed 
There are many reasons why an employee’s opposition to alleged 
                                                          
 37.  See, e.g., Brake & Grossman, supra note 14, at 914 (explaining courts that have recognized 
the opposition clause encourage employees to bring suspected discrimination to the attention of 
employers before involving the courts and the EEOC).  Employees also may oppose alleged 
unlawful discrimination other than by directly raising it with employers.  See e.g., Adams v. 
Northstar Location Servs., No. 09-CV-1063-JTC, 2010 WL 3911415, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2010) 
(opposition conduct may include “making complaints to management, writing critical letters to 
customers, protesting against discrimination by industry, and expressing support of co-workers who 
have filed formal charges”).  
 38.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). 
 39.  See Kenneth T. Lopatka, Protection Under the National Labor Relations Act and Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act for Employees Who Protest Discrimination in Private Employment, 50 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1179, 1183, 1183 n.22 (1975) (stating “the legislative history of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
does not help to define the contours of the section 704(a) right to ‘oppose,’ a right theretofore not 
included in the anti-reprisal provisions of any federal labor statute[]” and providing a detailed 
legislative history of the “opposed” language in the anti-retaliation provision); Kattan, supra note 29, 
at 218 (“The Act’s legislative history indicates only that Congress gave scant attention to the 
provision.”); see id. at 222 (noting that Congress gave “cursory consideration or appreciation” to the 
impact of the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII); see also Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 
588 F.2d 692, 695 n.4 (9th Cir. 1978) (“The legislative history sheds no light on Congress’ intention 
behind the opposition clause.”); Hochstadt v. Worcester Found. for Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d 
222, 230 (1st Cir. 1976) (explaining that legislative history does not address what Congress intended 
by the term “oppose. . . . The statute says no more, and the committee reports on the Civil Rights of 
1964 and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1963, which later became Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act, repeat the language of 704(a) without any explanation. . . . [t]he proceedings and floor 
debates over Title VII are similarly unrevealing.” (citations omitted)).  
 40.  Hochstadt, 545 F.2d at 230.  
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unlawful discrimination might fail to qualify as statutorily protected activity.  
For instance, it has long been held that the manner in which an employee 
engages in opposition may stymie protection.  To determine whether 
opposition conduct is protected, courts balance the Act’s purpose of 
protecting individuals engaging in reasonable opposition activities against 
Congress’s desire not to tie the hands of employers in selecting, controlling, 
and disciplining personnel.
41
  Where exactly the line is drawn between 
protected and unprotected opposition conduct is not precise.  Certain acts, 
however, have been held to be beyond the pale of protection, including 




 disloyal and a breach of trust,
44
 or 
                                                          
 41.  See Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1312 (6th Cir. 1989) 
(noting employees are not protected when they violate legitimate employer rules and orders, disrupt 
the employment environment, or interfere with the employer’s goals); Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. 
Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 257 (4th Cir. 1998) (explaining the test under the opposition clause 
“balances the purpose of the Act to protect persons engaging in reasonable activities opposing 
discrimination, against Congress’ desire not to prevent employers from legitimately disciplining 
their employees”); see also Shoaf v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 294 F. Supp. 2d 746, 755 (M.D.N.C. 
2003) (holding that employee’s action providing confidential information to another employee who 
had filed a discrimination claim against their employer was not protected opposition under Title VII; 
the employee supplying the information breached the employer’s trust and confidence).  
 42.  See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 795, 803 (1973) (noting that 
“[n]othing in Title VII compels an employer to absolve and rehire one who has engaged in such 
deliberate, unlawful activity against it” in reference to a plaintiff who was arrested and pleaded 
guilty to a charge of obstructing justice while protesting employer); Laughlin, 149 F.3d at 259 n.3 
(collecting cases that stand for the proposition that “[i]t is black letter law that illegal actions are not 
protected activity under Title VII”). 
 43.  See Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 567 (2d Cir. 2000) (slapping coworker in 
response to alleged sexual harassment was not protected activity). 
 44.  See, e.g., Laughlin, 149 F.3d at 259–60 (holding that employee who, unbeknownst to her 
supervisor, took from his desk “sensitive personnel documents” about another employee’s 
discrimination action, copied them and sent them to the other employee did not engage in protected 
opposition conduct as her actions breached her employer’s trust); O’Day v. McDonnell Douglas 
Helicopter Co., 79 F.3d 756, 763–64 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding an employee did not engage in 
protected activity when he “committed a serious breach of trust, not only in rummaging through his 
supervisor’s office for confidential documents, but also in copying those documents and showing 
them to a co-worker”); Jennings v. Tinley Park Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 146, 864 F.2d 1368, 
1375 (7th Cir. 1988) (employee’s “unreasonable conduct” was not protected activity when she went 
above supervisor’s head regarding a salary dispute in a “deliberate attempt[] to undermine a 
superior’s ability to perform his job”); Hochstadt, 545 F.2d at 227–28, 234 (employee’s actions 
“constituted serious acts of disloyalty” and thus were unprotected conduct when employee, among 
other things, interrupted meetings, spread unfounded rumors about her employer, permitted a local 
reporter to examine files containing confidential salary information and incurred nearly $1,000 in 
charges on her employer’s telephones for personal calls to her lawyers).  But see EEOC v. Crown 
Zellerbach Corp., 720 F.2d 1008, 1014–15 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting that all opposition is “in some 
sense disloyal” and that disloyalty alone would not strip protection against retaliation and 
distinguishing Hochstadt because in that case the plaintiff’s actions were not only disloyal but 
“resulted in poor work performance by her and also in diminished performance and reduced morale 
in other employees who worked with her”); see also Jennings, 864 F.2d at 1375 (“It is doubtful 
whether loyalty alone can be a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for disciplining an employee 
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unduly disruptive to the workplace and working relationships.
45
 
Aside from denying protection based on the manner in which opposition 
is expressed, more recently, some courts also have denied protection for 
opposition that is non-purposive.
46
  In other words, unless the employee 
challenges alleged discrimination with the purpose of eliminating or 
remedying it, she has not engaged in protected activity.  For example, an 
employee complaint about discrimination made to a coworker in passing that 
happens to make its way back to a supervisor would not be protected 




b. Belief about the Unlawfulness of the Conduct Opposed 
In addition to the conditions placed on the manner of expressing 
protected opposition noted above, an employee must also hold a reasonable 
belief about the unlawfulness of the complained-of conduct in order to be 
protected by the opposition clause.  Courts that have analyzed the text of the 
clause have concluded that its “plain meaning” bars an employer from 
retaliating against an employee because she has opposed “an actual unlawful 
employment practice.”
48
  Reading the statute in this manner would require a 
plaintiff to plead and prove not only that she was retaliated against for 
opposing unlawful discrimination, but also to prove that the underlying 
practice she opposed was, in fact, unlawful under Title VII.  In Title VII’s 
early days, several district courts read the statute in this manner.
49
  That 
                                                                                                                       
 
engaged in opposition to an unlawful employment practice.”). 
 45.  See Hochstadt, 545 F.2d at 227–28 (finding employee’s numerous acts of opposition 
disrupted the working environment and undermined working relationships).  
 46.  See Pitrolo v. County. of Bucombe, No. 07-2145, 2009 WL 1010634, at *3 (4th Cir. Mar. 
11, 2009) (holding that plaintiff’s non-purposive complaints of gender discrimination made to her 
father did not constitute protected activity even if her employer learned of the complaint); see also 
Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson Cnty. Tenn., 555 U.S. 271, 281 (2009) (Alito, 
J., concurring) (arguing that the opposition clause should be interpreted to protect only purposive 
conduct). 
 47.  See supra note 46. 
 48.  See, e.g., Jordan v. Alt. Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 338 (4th Cir. 2006) (“The plain meaning 
of the statutory language provides protection of an employee’s opposition activity when the 
employee responds to an actual unlawful employment practice.”); Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale 
& Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1137 (5th Cir. 1981) (considering and rejecting the proposition that 
the opposition clause requires proof that an actual unlawful employment practice occurred); Sias v. 
City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1978) (explaining that, by its terms, the 
opposition clause “could be said to be limited to cases where the employer has in fact engaged in an 
unlawful employment practice”).   
 49.  See EEOC v. C&D Sportswear Corp., 398 F. Supp. 300, 306 (M.D. Ga. 1975) (rejecting 
 
  
2014]    REJECTING A CASE LAW-CENTERED APPROACH TO TITLE VII 771 
interpretation has now been rejected by every federal court of appeals to 




At the outset, conditioning the viability of a retaliation claim on a 
determination (presumably by a court or jury) that the alleged underlying 
discrimination is actually unlawful would be extremely unfair to employees.  
As one commentator has remarked “[t]he complexity of the law and of 
various factual situations surrounding discrimination make an employee’s 
correct assessment of the merits of his claim difficult in all but the most 
egregious instances of discrimination.”
51
  Predetermining what employment 
                                                                                                                       
 
plaintiff’s retaliation claim, and holding that text of the statute requires plaintiff to complain about 
discrimination that is “well-founded”; otherwise plaintiffs complain about discrimination at their 
peril); see also Kinard v. Nat’l Supermarkets, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 106, 111 (S.D. Ala. 1978) (relying 
on C&D Sportswear for proposition that even assuming employee was retaliated against for 
opposing discrimination, “she would not be protected under [Title VII] because the employment 
practice she opposed was not unlawful”); Winsey v. Pace Coll., 394 F. Supp. 1324, 1331 (S.D.N.Y. 
1975) (explaining that the employment practice “which [the] plaintiff opposes must be, when 
engaged in, unlawful under Title VII in order to support a later charge of retaliation”); cf. Berg v. La 
Crosse Cooler Co., 612 F.2d 1041, 1043 (7th Cir. 1980) (reversing grant of summary judgment to 
employer; district court granted judgment for employer after the Supreme Court, in another case, 
held that the same practice the plaintiff opposed in this case did not violate Title VII). 
 50.  See Wyatt v. Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1994) (protected opposition requires both 
subjective good faith and objective reasonable belief that challenged practice violated Title VII); 
Wimmer v. Suffolk Cnty. Police Dep’t, 176 F.3d 125, 134 (2d Cir. 1999) (protected opposition 
requires only a good faith, reasonable belief that the challenged practice was unlawful); Moore v. 
City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 341 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Whether the employee opposes, or participates in 
a proceeding against, the employer’s activity, the employee must hold an objectively reasonable 
belief, in good faith, that the activity they oppose is unlawful under Title VII.” (citation omitted)); 
Jordan, 458 F.3d at 337–38 (4th Cir. 2006) (opposition activity is protected when it responds to an 
employment practice that the employee in good faith reasonably believes is unlawful); Payne, 654 
F.2d at 1137 (considering and rejecting the proposition that the opposition clause requires proof that 
an actual unlawful employment practice had occurred); Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 
561, 579 (6th Cir. 2000) (opposition must be based on a good faith, reasonable belief about the 
unlawfulness of an employer’s action); Tate v. Exec. Mgmt. Servs. Inc., 546 F.3d 528, 532 (7th Cir. 
2008) (reasonable, good faith belief is required); Barker v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 513 F.3d 831, 834 
(8th Cir. 2008) (opposition is protected if employee had good faith, objectively reasonable belief that 
practices were unlawful); Sias, 588 F.2d at 695 (“When an employee reasonably believes that 
discrimination exists, opposition thereto is opposition to an employment practice made unlawful by 
Title VII even if the employee turns out to be mistaken as to the facts.” (citations omitted)); 
Crumpacker v. Kan. Dep’t of Human Res., 338 F.3d 1163, 1172 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that 
employee must hold both good faith and objectively reasonable belief about unlawful discrimination 
to be protected from retaliation); Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d 1307, 1311–12 (11th Cir. 
2002) (to engage in protected activity, an employee only has to show a good faith, reasonable belief 
that the employer committed unlawful discrimination); Parker v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 
1012, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“[A]n employee seeking the protection of the opposition clause [must] 
demonstrate a good faith, reasonable belief that the challenged practice violates Title VII.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 51.  Kattan, supra note 29, at 228; see also Gorod, supra note 20, at 1490–91 (noting that 
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practices a court might hold unlawful or what conduct a trier of fact might 
determine to be unlawful under Title VII is guesswork.
52
  While it 
undoubtedly still occurs, the instances of an employer announcing it will not 
hire an individual because of her race, sex, religion, or national origin are 
thankfully much rarer than they used to be.
53
  Because most cases of 
employer conduct will be much less clear-cut, courts’ decisions are not often 
predictable.  For the aforementioned reasons, to the extent courts have 
correctly determined that, literally read, the opposition clause requires 
employees to prove that the complained-of conduct is unlawful, courts have 
been correct to reject that interpretation. 
2. Rejecting a Literal Interpretation of the Clause 
Undoubtedly, the Supreme Court’s most recent method of statutory 
interpretation emphasizes the primacy of a statute’s text over its purposes in 
giving its language meaning.
54
  However, the Court has held that it is 
appropriate to look beyond the statute’s language in search of meaning when 
                                                                                                                       
 
judges and scholars have a difficult time determining what constitutes harassment and if they cannot 
do so, “how are workers supposed to anticipate how the courts will define it in any given case”). 
 52.  Two concepts are at play here.  On the one hand, a court may hold that certain practices are 
not unlawful under Title VII.  See, e.g., Weeks, 291 F.3d at 1315 (requiring employees to arbitrate 
employment discrimination disputes was not an unlawful employment practice violative of Title 
VII); Wimmer, 176 F.3d at 134–35 (affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim 
where plaintiff police officer protested alleged discriminatory comments and conduct by co-
employees against non-employee minority citizens; plaintiff failed to show discrimination affected 
the terms and conditions of employment, which is the only type of conduct Title VII bars).  On the 
other hand, a particular employment practice may be unlawful (e.g., racial harassment), but the 
employee must then show that the particular conduct complained of or facts in her case rise to the 
level of an actionable claim.  See, e.g., Jordan, 458 F.3d at 338–40 (holding that plaintiff failed to 
show that one racist, crude comment could result in a reasonable belief the plaintiff had suffered a 
racially hostile work environment). 
 53.  See Pat K. Chew, Seeing Subtle Racism, 6 STAN. J. CR. & C.L. 183, 199 (2010) (“Instances 
of blatant and explicit racial discrimination . . . unfortunately still occur—but much less frequently.  
Employment discrimination cases prohibiting expressly racist employment decisions, as well as 
evolving social norms in our language and conduct, help to explain [the] decline . . . .”).   
 54.  See, e.g., Robert J. Gregory, Overcoming Text in an Age of Textualism: A Practioner’s 
Guide to Arguing Cases of Statutory Interpretation, 35 AKRON L. REV. 451, 455–60 (2002) 
(explaining that for much of the twentieth century, “the predominate view of statutory interpretation 
emphasized the statute’s purpose more so than literal textual meaning” but beginning in the 1980s an 
interpretative methodology described as “new textualism” took hold; text “is not merely a means to 
an end . . . in ascertaining congressional intent; . . . it is the end itself”); see also Alex Long, 
Employment Retaliation and the Accident of Text, 90 OR. L. REV. 525, 531 (2011) (explaining that 
while courts at one time were willing to “gloss over statutory language” that was inconsistent with 
the statute’s purpose, a textualist approach to interpretation began to arise in the 1980s and 1990s 
and “[e]ven the devoted purposivist Justices on the Court now feel compelled to emphasize text at 
the expense of legislative purpose”). 
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“the effect of implementing the ordinary meaning would be ‘patently 
absurd’ or the result would be demonstrably at odds with the intention of its 
drafters.”
55
  Protecting employees against retaliation for only those practices 
that are determined by judge or jury to be unlawful would be patently at 
odds with congressional intent, Title VII’s purposes, and the Court’s 
interpretation of the statute.  Specifically, such an interpretation would 
hamper informal resolution of claims and undermine both the statute’s 
objective of avoiding harm as well as the anti-retaliation provision’s 
principal purpose of maintaining unfettered access to Title VII’s statutory 
remedial mechanisms. 
a. Informal Resolution of Claims 
First, tying a retaliation claim to the success of the underlying 
discrimination claim would undermine Congress’s desire to have workplace 
discrimination disputes resolved by informal resolution instead of 
litigation.
56
  That Congress intended to eliminate workplace discrimination 
via informal resolution in the first instance is evidenced by Title VII’s 
statutory scheme, which encourages conciliation rather than litigation.
57
  If, 
after investigating charges of discrimination, the EEOC determines that 
there is reasonable cause to believe the charge is true, it must attempt to 
resolve the charge through informal methods of conference, conciliation, and 
persuasion.
58
  The EEOC may sue the employer in court only if those 
informal methods fail.
59
  Incentivizing the informal resolution of claims, 
however, is achievable outside of the formal proceedings before the EEOC 
                                                          
 55.  Gregory, supra note 54, at 464; see also United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 
235, 242 (1989) (“The plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the ‘rare case [in 
which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the 
intentions of its drafters.’” (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982))). 
 56.  See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998) (explaining that Congress 
intended “to promote conciliation rather than litigation in the Title VII context”). 
 57.  See EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 77–78 (1984) (stating the one goal of Congress 
under Title VII was that violations of Title VII could be resolved without entering the court system). 
 58.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006) (“If the Commission determines after . . . investigation that 
there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to 
eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, 
conciliation, and persuasion.”). 
 59.  See id. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (explaining that EEOC may file a civil action if it has been unable 
to secure an acceptable conciliation agreement); see also Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 63–64 (explaining 
that if informal resolution measures fail, the EEOC is “empowered to bring a civil action against the 
employer”); see also EEOC v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 735 F.2d 69, 72 n.2 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(explaining The Civil Rights Act of 1964 empowered the EEOC to bring civil claims against a party 
if conciliation of the charges of discrimination could not be reached). 
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because of the opposition clause.
60
  Without broad protection from 
retaliation under the opposition clause, an employee would have no 
incentive to bring perceived discrimination to the attention of an employer 
and thereby affording the employer the opportunity to correct the problem.
61
  
Requiring an employee to be absolutely certain about the merits of perceived 
discrimination before protecting her from retaliation is inconsistent with the 
goal of informal resolution of claims.  Rather than report discrimination to 
her employer, the employee would be forced to run to the EEOC in the first 
instance where she would be protected under the participation clause 
regardless of the ultimate merits of her claim.
62
  While legislative history of 
the anti-retaliation provision is sparse,
63
 the opposition clause demonstrates 
Congress’s intent to encourage employees and employers to try to resolve 
alleged workplace discrimination, quite literally, before making a federal 
case out of it.
64
 
b. Avoiding Harm 
Tying the retaliation claim to underlying discrimination would also 
undermine Title VII’s primary objective: to prevent or avoid the harm 
caused by unlawful discrimination.
65
  The Court has articulated this 
objective in several decisions interpreting Title VII.
66
  That objective has led 
the Court to interpret Title VII in ways that encourage employers to educate 
                                                          
 60.  See Parker v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“[B]y 
extending protection to employees who oppose discriminatory practices without recourse to the 
EEOC, Congress encouraged voluntary internal attempts to remedy discrimination.”); see also Brake 
& Grossman, supra note 14, at 914 (explaining that courts have “recognized the importance of 
providing protection from retaliation under the opposition clause in order to encourage employees to 
seek to resolve . . . disputes informally, before involving the courts and the EEOC.”); Gorod, supra 
note 20, at 1507–08 (“[T]he very existence of the opposition clause suggests Congress’ interest in 
promoting informal, internal resolution of disputes under Title VII.”). 
 61.  Gorod, supra note 20, at 1470. 
 62.  Id.  See also Berg v. La Crosse Cooler Co., 612 F.2d 1041, 1046 (7th Cir. 1980) 
(explaining that a literal interpretation of the opposition clause would “tend to force employees to 
file formal charges rather than seek conciliation or informal adjustment of grievances” (quoting Sias 
v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1978))). 
 63.  Lopatka, supra note 39, at 1183; Kattan, supra note 29, at 218. 
 64.  See Sias, 588 F.2d at 695 (adopting the reasonable belief standard because “[i]t should not 
be necessary for an employee to resort immediately to the EEOC or similar State agencies in order to 
bring complaints of discrimination to the attention of the employer with some measure of 
protection”). 
 65.  See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 774, 806 (1998) (noting the primary 
objective of Title VII is to avoid harm). 
 66.  See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson Cnty. Tenn., 555 U.S. 271, 279 
(2009); Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805–06. 
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themselves and their employees about Title VII’s prohibitions and 
implement anti-discrimination programs, including effective employee 
grievance procedures, that serve to prevent discrimination from occurring 
and serve to correct alleged discriminatory practices promptly when they 
come to light.
67
  To achieve the objective, the Court has indicated that 
employees should report alleged discrimination to their employers and report 
it early.  The objective underlies an affirmative defense the Court created 
from whole cloth in two seminal cases addressing hostile work environment 
sexual harassment, Burlington Industries v. Ellerth
68
 and Faragher v. City of 
Boca Raton.
69
  The Ellerth–Faragher affirmative defense demonstrates why 
a literal interpretation of the opposition clause is contrary to Title VII’s main 
objective. 
In instances where alleged harassment is committed by a supervisor, an 
employer is entitled to assert the affirmative defense as long as the 
harassment does not culminate in a tangible employment action
70
—i.e., “a 
significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to 
promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a 
decision causing a significant change in benefits.”
71
  The defense requires a 
showing of two elements: “(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to 
prevent and correct promptly any . . . harassing behavior, and (b) that the 
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive 
or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm 
otherwise.”
72
  In explaining its rationale for the affirmative defense, the 
Court noted that it advances the statute’s primary objective of avoiding harm 
by recognizing the employer’s affirmative obligation to prevent alleged 
statutory violations from occurring and gives credit to employers who make 
reasonable efforts to discharge their duties.
73
  The defense also advances the 
objective of avoiding harm by requiring the employee to promptly report 
alleged harassment.
74
  Although neither Ellerth nor Faragher addressed the 
                                                          
 67.  See Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 544–45 (discussing the incentive Title VII provides employers to 
implement anti-discrimination programs).  
 68.  Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
 69.  Faragher, 524 U.S. at 775. 
 70.  See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761–62, 765 (explaining that employers are only liable for a 
supervisor’s “tangible employment decision[s]” inflicted upon subordinate employees; and the lack 
of a tangible action creates an affirmative defense for the employer).  
 71.  Id. at 761. 
 72.  Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
 73.  See id. at 806–07 (explaining that the statute’s “primary objective” is to prevent harm, 
rather than redress harm, by “encouraging forethought by employers”).   
 74.  See id. (barring recovery for plaintiffs who do not use the employer’s complaint procedures 
to report harassment); see also Gorod, supra note 20, at 1506 (“The Supreme Court’s language [in 
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scope of the opposition clause, the affirmative defense articulated in those 
cases presupposes that the employee will be afforded broad protection from 
retaliation for reporting perceived harassment.
75
  Otherwise, the employee 
would have no incentive to take advantage of the employer’s grievance 
mechanism.
76
  Requiring the employee to be certain she is challenging an 
actual hostile work environment before protecting her from retaliation would 
undermine the principle of avoiding harm that forms the basis for the 
affirmative defense.
77
  It would have the opposite effect.  An employee 
would be more likely to endure the harm of discrimination if she knew that 




Indeed, it is particularly in the context of a hostile work environment 
that certainty presents difficulties.  As explained earlier, determining when 
conduct will satisfy the standard of an actual statutory violation is 
guesswork.
79
  That is no more evident than with regard to hostile work 
environment claims.  The Supreme Court has recognized as much.  A hostile 
work environment claim often arises from a series of conduct that alone may 
not suffice to violate the statute but cumulatively might do so.
80
  The point at 
which abusive conduct becomes actionable, or in hostile work environment 
terms, the point at which it becomes “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter 
the terms and conditions of employment,” by its nature, is not “a 
mathematically precise test.”
81
  One commentator has explained hostile 
work environment in the following way: 
                                                                                                                       
 
Faragher and Ellerth] could not be clearer.  Employees should report sexual harassment not only 
early, but before it is even harassment.”). 
 75.  See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t. of Nashville and Davidson Cnty. Tenn., 555 U.S. 271, 278–
79 (2009) (explaining that broad protection under the opposition clause was necessary so as not to 
undermine the Faragher–Ellerth affirmative defense and the statute’s goal to incentivize employers 
to strengthen investigation procedures).  
 76.  See id. at 279 (arguing that decreased protection would allow employers to penalize 
employees for complaining about harassment). 
 77.  See id. (noting that employees would not complain about harassment if extensive evidence 
and investigation was required to prevent termination for voicing concern). 
 78.  See id. (pointing out that an employee’s fear of retaliation is already “the leading reason 
why people stay silent instead of voicing their concerns about bias and discrimination” (quoting 
Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 20 (2005))). 
 79.  See discussion supra Part II.B.1.b. 
 80.  See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115 (2002) (“Hostile 
environment claims are different in kind from discrete acts.  Their very nature involves repeated 
conduct. . . . Such claims are based on the cumulative effect of individual acts.”). 
 81.  See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 23 (1993) (explaining that determining the 
required hostility and abuse requires examination of circumstances unique to each case).  
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[T]heir beginnings may be inappropriate, but not unlawful.  Thus, this 
context seems to threaten to produce a high number of false positives, 
or situations in which members of the general public might assume that 
conduct was unlawful even though the conduct clearly is not unlawful 
under well-established case law.
82
 
Considering the difficulty in determining the moment when, if at all, 
harassing conduct rises to the level of being actually unlawful, it would set 
up an employee for failure to permit her to only challenge a hostile work 
environment informally without fear of retaliation when she is absolutely 
certain about the validity of the claim. 
c. Access to Title VII’s Statutory Remedial Mechanisms 
Requiring an employee to show she is challenging an unlawful 
employment practice would also undermine the principal purpose of the 
anti-retaliation provision itself: to maintain unfettered access to Title VII’s 
statutory remedial mechanisms.
83
  The purpose is arguably most readily 
implicated in participation clause cases because the charge begins the 
process of seeking remedies for alleged statutory violations.
84
  Title VII 
grants the EEOC and courts broad powers to remedy alleged 
discrimination.
85
  Because filing a charge is often a precursor to pursuing 
those remedies, barriers that might impede the willingness of employees to 
file charges and to participate in EEOC proceedings would undermine the 
anti-retaliation provision’s principal purpose.
86
  As explained below, 
however, interpreting Title VII in a manner that would deter employees from 
making informal complaints to employers about alleged discrimination 
might also thwart access to statutory remedies.  Such an interpretation 
                                                          
 82.  Gorod, supra note 20, at 1493. 
 83.  See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (outlining importance of easy 
access to EEOC reporting procedures). 
 84.  See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 85.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2006) (setting forth remedies available to employees when a 
court finds that an employer has engaged in unlawful discrimination; if the discrimination was 
intentional, then the court may award other “affirmative action as may be appropriate,” including, 
among other things, “reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay . . . or any other 
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate”); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b) (2006) (listing authority 
of the EEOC to award “appropriate remedies” for statutory violation); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(a)(1), 
(b)(1) (2006) (explaining entitlement to compensatory and punitive damages in cases of intentional 
discrimination); see also Robinson, 519 U.S. at 342–43 (identifying remedial mechanisms available 
to employees under Title VII). 
 86.  See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006) (explaining that 
Title VII depends “on employees who are willing to file complaints and act as witnesses” and 
effective enforcement of the statute is only possible “if employees [feel] free to approach officials”). 
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should be rejected, consistent with recent Supreme Court decisions broadly 
interpreting the anti-retaliation provision in recognition of its principal 
purpose. 
The Court repeatedly has interpreted the anti-retaliation provision 
broadly to effectuate its primary purpose.  For instance, in Burlington 
Northern & SantaFe Railway. Co. v. White, the Court addressed, among 
other things, whether the phrase “discriminate against” used in the anti-
retaliation provision confines itself to activity that affects the terms and 
conditions of employment or reaches more broadly to include adverse 
actions that do not directly implicate the employment relationship.
87
  The 
Court held that the broader reading was proper.
88
  In reaching its holding, the 
Court first noted that the anti-retaliation and substantive provisions are not 
coterminous, and thus, the two sections should not be read in pari materia.
89
  
The substantive provision, among other things, bars employers from 
discriminating against individuals “with respect to . . . compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”
90
  Thus, the text limits the scope of 
the provision’s protection to actions that affect or alter the conditions of 
employment.
91
  The anti-retaliation provision contains no such limiting 
language.  The language merely provides that an employer may not 
“discriminate against” an employee because of that individual’s protected 
activity.
92
  The language in the two provisions differs, and the Court 
presumed that “Congress intended” that difference to matter.
93
  Moreover, 
                                                          
 87.  See id. at 57 (noting a circuit split on scope of retaliation provision in Title VII). 
 88.  See id. (concluding that the anti-retaliation provision covers actions that occur outside of 
the workplace when the actions are “materially adverse to a reasonable employee or job applicant”). 
 89.  See id. at 61 (explaining that Burlington and the government, which filed an amicus brief, 
advanced the position that the two provisions should be read in pari materia; a position with which 
the Court did not agree). 
 90.  Under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2) (2006): 
        It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer  
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; 
or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any 
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities . . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
 91.  See Burlington, 548 U.S. at 62 (discussing limiting function of various words in the 
substantive part of Title VII’s discrimination provision).  
 92.  See id. at 62 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006)) (highlighting importance of wording 
differences between anti-relation and anti-discrimination provisions). 
 93. See id. at 62–63 (noting wording differences in statutes create a presumption of 
congressional intent to create a “legal difference” between the statutes). 
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according to the Court, the underlying purpose of the anti-retaliation 
provision reinforces what the language already indicates: broader protection 
against retaliation than is applicable to the substantive provision.
94
  The 
purposes of the substantive provision of Title VII include securing a 
workplace where individuals are free from discrimination based on who they 
are, i.e., their status.
95
  The Court reasoned that Congress only needed to bar 
employment-related discrimination to secure that objective.
96
  Conversely, 
the anti-retaliation provision seeks to secure Title VII’s “primary objective 
by preventing an employer from interfering (through retaliation) with an 
employee’s efforts” to enforce the statute’s basic guarantees.
97
  That 
objective could only be achieved by eliminating the many ways an employer 
might stymie an employee’s efforts to enforce his or her rights under the 
Act.
98
  According to the Court, “[a]n employer can effectively retaliate 
against an employee by taking actions not directly related to his employment 
or by causing him harm outside the workplace.”
99
  As Judge Richard Posner 
has colorfully put it, “[s]hooting a person for filing a complaint of 
discrimination would be an effective method of retaliation . . . .”
100
  Such an 
act would certainly deter an employee from complaining about 
discrimination, but would have nothing to do with the workplace in the way 
that docking an employee’s pay or demoting him would.  A limited 
construction of the anti-retaliation provision would thus undermine its 
primary purpose, which is to “[m]aintain[] unfettered access to statutory 
remedial mechanisms.”
101
  After all, an employee would clearly be hesitant 
to complain about discrimination if she knew an employer was free to 
retaliate against her as long as the retaliatory act did not directly affect her 
employment.
102
  The Court further explained that a broad interpretation of 
                                                          
 94. See id. at 63–64 (explaining that the purpose of the anti-retaliation provision is to prevent 
harms based on employee conduct, and a broad category of non-employment activities must be 
included to achieve that purpose). 
 95.  Id. at 63. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  See id. at 63–64 (explaining that the anti-relation provision’s purpose would be defeated if 
employers could take actions against employees that were “not directly related to” employment or 
occurred outside the workplace, such as filing false criminal charges or other means of harassment 
(citing Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 984 (10th Cir. 1996))). 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 259 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 101.  Burlington, 548 U.S. at 64 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 102.  See id. at 63–64 (noting that employees would refrain from reporting harassment if 
employers could only be liable for work-related actions occurring at the workplace). 
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the anti-retaliation provision was necessary because Title VII depends on 
individuals “who are willing to file complaints and act as witnesses.”
103
  The 
statute cannot be effectively enforced unless individuals feel “free to 
approach officials with their grievances” without fear of reprisal.
104
 
In Robinson v. Shell Oil,
105
 the anti-retaliation provision’s principal 
purpose led the Court to interpret the term “employee” broadly.
106
  The issue 
was whether the anti-retaliation provision extended protection to former 
employees even though its language references only applicants and 
employees.
107
  The Court acknowledged that at first blush, the term 
“employee” appears to refer only to persons who have an existing 
relationship with their employer.
108
  However, the Court found that the term 
standing alone was ambiguous.
109
  In reaching that conclusion, the Court 
noted that the term “employee” was not preceded by a temporal qualifier, 
such as former or current, in either the anti-retaliation provision or the 
statute’s general definition section.
110
  Moreover, the Court considered the 
broader context of the statute and noted that other Title VII provisions use 
the term “employee” and appear to contemplate something more than a 
current employee.  For instance, the statute authorizes a court and the EEOC 
to order reinstatement or hiring of employees as a remedy to unlawful 
discrimination.
111
  Because an employer cannot reinstate a current employee, 
the term envisions that former employees would avail themselves of the 
statute’s remedial mechanisms.
112
  Having found the term “employee” 
ambiguous, the Court determined that it was far more consistent to include 
former employees within the scope of employees protected from retaliation, 
particularly as the broader context of the statute contemplates that former 
employees will access Title VII’s remedies.
113
  It would have made little 
sense and would have been inconsistent with Title VII’s statutory scheme to 
                                                          
 103.  Id. at 67. 
 104.  Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960)). 
 105.  519 U.S. 337 (1997). 
 106.  In Robinson, the plaintiff alleged that his employer fired him because of his race.  Id. at 
339.  He subsequently filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC.  Id.  After doing so, he 
applied for another job.  Id.  The plaintiff alleged that in retaliation for his charge, his former 
employer gave him a negative reference when contacted by his prospective employer.  Id. 
 107.  Id. at 339–40. 
 108.  Id. at 341. 
 109.  Id. at 344. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  See id. at 342 (referencing the text of 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(g)(1) and 2000e-16(b) (2013)). 
 112.  See id.; see also id. at 345 (noting that “several sections of the statute plainly contemplate 
that former employees will make use of the remedial mechanisms of Title VII”). 
 113.  Id. 
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interpret the statute to exclude from access to statutory remedial mechanisms 
a class of employees Congress clearly intended to include among the 
individuals who could access them.  The EEOC also supported the more 
inclusive interpretation of “employee”, arguing that excluding former 
employees would provide employers a perverse incentive to fire workers 
who file charges of discrimination.
114
  Burlington Northern and Robinson 
illustrate the importance of the anti-retaliation provision to Title VII’s 
statutory scheme.  Without broad protection from retaliation, employees 
would be deterred from filing the charges and engaging in EEOC 
proceedings that provide access to the statutory remedial mechanisms 
available to employees aggrieved by discrimination. 
A narrow, literal interpretation of the opposition clause also would 
undermine the provision’s principal purpose.  This result is demonstrated by 
(again) considering hostile work environment claims.  The Ellerth–Faragher 
affirmative defense has been interpreted as requiring employees to bring 
their grievances to the attention of employers before seeking any remedial 
relief for alleged discrimination that Title VII may afford.
115
  Thus, 
generally, an employee who files an EEOC charge alleging hostile work 
environment without first taking advantage of an employer’s internal, 
informal grievance mechanism will likely have any subsequent lawsuit 
dismissed, regardless of the merits of the claim.
116
  However, without 
extending broad protection from retaliation following an informal complaint, 
an employee has no incentive to raise suspected discrimination with her 
employer outside of the context of the EEOC.  In another of its recent 
retaliation decisions, Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville 
and Davidson County,
117
 the Court broadly interpreted Title VII’s opposition 
clause for this very reason. 
                                                          
 114.  See id. at 346 (referencing the EEOC’s conclusion that excluding former employees would 
hinder the effectiveness of Title VII). 
 115.  See Jones v. Lakeland, 318 F. App’x 730, 737 (11th Cir. 2008) (plaintiff’s subsequent 
harassment claim was barred because instead of filing a grievance under employer’s anti-
discrimination and harassment policies, plaintiff filed an EEOC charge).  The result is required by 
the holdings in Ellerth and Faragher.  See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807–
08 (1998) (adopting same rule as was adopted in Ellerth and holding that a showing that a plaintiff 
failed to take advantage of an employer’s grievance procedure will normally suffice to satisfy the 
second prong of the affirmative defense and absolve the employer of liability). 
 116.  See Jones, 318 F. App’x at 733, 737 (despite hearing a daily barrage of opprobrious racial 
slurs by coworkers, judgment in favor of employer affirmed as plaintiff filed an EEOC charge 
without first taking advantage of employer’s grievance procedure); see also Brake & Grossman, 
supra note 14, at 915–16 (explaining that employees must use “specified employer challenges” to 
promptly report harassing conduct to protect their legal right to later sue for that harassment). 
 117.  555 U.S. 271 (2009). 
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Crawford resolved whether an employee responding to employer 
questions during an internal investigation about sexual harassment is 
opposing an unlawful employment practice.
118
  The Court held the anti-
retaliation provision protects employees in these instances.
119
  The employer 
and amici argued that unless the bar is set high regarding the type of conduct 
deemed to be opposition, employers would have little incentive to 
investigate possible discrimination because they will want to avoid the 
headache of asking about possible discrimination, which could then result in 
liability.
120
  The Court rejected the argument, explaining that such reasoning 
ignores the strong incentive employers have under the Ellerth–Faragher 
affirmative defense to ferret out and put a stop to discriminatory activity in 
their operations.
121
  Further, the Court explained that the Sixth Circuit’s rule 
would create an untenable catch-22 for employees.
122
  If the employee 
speaks up in response to an employer’s inquiry during an internal 
investigation about harassment, the employer would be free to sanction the 
employee without penalty.
123
  If, however, that employee keeps quiet and 
later files a Title VII claim, the employer may escape liability by arguing 
that while it took reasonable care to prevent and correct discrimination, the 
employee failed to take advantage of the opportunities the employer 
provided during the investigation.
124
  Moreover, the Court explained that the 
Sixth Circuit’s rule would undermine the Ellerth–Faragher defense and the 
statute’s primary objective of avoiding harm.
125
  According to the Court, 
“[i]f it were clear law that an employee who reported discrimination in 
answering an employer’s questions could be penalized with no remedy, 
prudent employees would have a good reason to keep quiet about Title VII 
offenses against themselves or against others.”
126
  The Court explained that 
this is no “imaginary horrible” given that the leading reason why employees 
fail to report discrimination is fear of retaliation.
127
 
The Court’s analysis in Crawford applies equally here.  It would 
                                                          
 118.  Id. at 273. 
 119.  Id. at 284.  In reaching its holding, the Court considered such factors as dictionary 
definitions of the term “opposed” and the EEOC’s position on the issue.  Id. at 276. 
 120.  See id. at 278 (referring to these arguments as “unconvincing” given precedent). 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  See id. at 279 (noting that the appellate court’s decision creates a “real dilemma for any 
knowledgeable employee in a hostile work environment if the boss took steps to assure a defense”). 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. 
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similarly undermine the effectiveness of the Ellerth–Faragher defense to 
protect employees who complain about harassment only if they are certain 
how a judge or jury will ultimately decide their claim.  In these 
circumstances, employees would have good reason to keep quiet instead of 
bringing grievances to an employer’s attention.  The failure to do so would 
undermine the principle of avoiding harm and also strip employees of the 
ability to pursue statutory remedies for the alleged harassment.  Thus, a 
literal interpretation of the provision would undermine its principal purpose 
of maintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms and 
serves as yet another reason why such an interpretation should be rejected. 
In sum, assuming the plain meaning of the opposition clause ties the 
success of a retaliation claim to the success of the underlying discrimination 
being challenged, there are sound reasons to reject that interpretation.  
Considering that a literal interpretation of the opposition clause would 
undermine congressional intent and Title VII’s goals, it stands to reason that 
the standard used to determine when opposition will be protected should 
avoid such issues.  As explained in the next section, however, application of 
the objective reasonable belief standard has raised the same concerns that 
gave rise to its creation. 
III. THE REASONABLE BELIEF STANDARD—A LIMITED BASELINE 
A. Assessing Reasonableness 
Rejecting a literal reading of the statute requires determining when an 
employee is protected for opposing perceived discrimination.  At one time, 
there was no uniform standard for determining when opposition was 
protected.  Some courts protected employees who complained about 
discrimination if the employee held a subjective, good faith belief that the 
challenged practice was unlawful.
128
  A lack of good faith was shown if the 
facts demonstrated that the plaintiff alleged discrimination for reasons other 
than to challenge honestly perceived discrimination or knowingly engaged in 
                                                          
 128.  See, e.g., Love v. Re/Max of America, Inc., 738 F.2d 383, 385 (10th Cir. 1984) (noting that 
the plaintiff’s good faith belief in discrimination was sufficient); Montiero v. Poole Silver Co., 615 
F.2d 4, 9 (1st Cir. 1984) (declining to decide whether plaintiff needed to show only that he harbored 
an honest or a reasonable belief about the illegality of the challenged practices but holding that 
plaintiff’s claim failed as it did not violate Title VII and was “insincerely raised”); see also Booker 
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1313 (6th Cir. 1989) (explaining that to be 
protected, a plaintiff must have harbored “a good faith belief that the practice is unlawful”).  See 
generally Rosenthal, supra note 20, at 1135–39 (explaining that of the courts of appeals, the Tenth 
Circuit consistently used a subjective good faith standard until after the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Clark County School Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001)). 
  
784 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
outright misrepresentations in reporting the alleged discrimination.
129
 
In addition to requiring a showing of good faith, most courts early on 
also required plaintiffs to demonstrate that they held a reasonable belief 
about the illegality of the challenged discrimination.  Requiring “objective 
reasonableness” as a threshold for protection begs the question: by what 
measure does a belief satisfy that standard?  Those parameters are 
paramount in determining how to assess reasonableness.  As one 
commentator has explained: 
While the courts of appeals seem to have largely settled on [the 
reasonable belief] standard, differences are starting to emerge in how 
that standard is applied . . . .  What does it mean, one might well 
wonder, for an individual’s belief to be reasonable?  Because the 
standard is . . . objective, it makes sense that there must be some 
baseline against which the plaintiff’s beliefs are measured, but what is 
the appropriate standard?  Should it be the governing case law, or the 
general public’s views, or some other alternative altogether?
130
 
The answer to that question among the lower federal courts appears to 
be the case law.  That approach is supported to some degree by the Court in 
its only decision to date to address the matter.  In Clark County School 
District v. Breeden,
131
 the Court did not settle whether the reasonable belief 
standard is a proper interpretation of the opposition clause, but the decision 
nevertheless did two things: (1) it solidified the use of an objective 
reasonableness (versus a subjective good faith) standard as the starting point 
for when an employee’s belief about discrimination should count as 
protected opposition, and (2) it justified in some courts limiting the factors 
used to determine the reasonableness of an employee’s belief to case law 
governing the underlying complained-of conduct. 
B. Breeden and the Case-Law Litmus Test 
In Clark County School District v. Breeden,
132
 a female plaintiff whose 
job required that she review the psychological evaluation reports of 
                                                          
 129.  See, e.g., Montiero, 615 F.2d at 9 (plaintiff did not engage in protected opposition as the 
district court found that his accusations of discrimination were not voiced in good faith but as a 
smoke screen for challenging legitimate criticism); see also Wilson v. UT Health Ctr., 973 F.2d 
1263, 1266 (5th Cir. 1992) (plaintiff did not engage in protected activity as facts demonstrated that 
she knowingly made misrepresentations in reporting alleged harassment and thus her conduct was 
opposite of good faith). 
 130.  Gorod, supra note 20, at 1484. 
 131.  532 U.S. 268 (2001). 
 132.  Id. 
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applicants, complained after her supervisor and a coworker joked about the 
contents of one of the reports as they were reviewing it.
133
  The report for 
one applicant revealed that the individual had once told a coworker “I hear 
making love to you is like making love to the Grand Canyon.”
134
  Plaintiff’s 
supervisor read the comment aloud, looked at her and said “I don’t know 
what that means.”
135
  The other employee said “Well, I’ll tell you later.”
136
  
Both men then chuckled.
137
  Plaintiff reported the comments to her 
coworker’s supervisor and to an assistant superintendent.
138
  She further 
alleged that her employer retaliated against her after she reported these 
comments.
139
  In her subsequent lawsuit alleging retaliation, the district 
court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer, which was 
reversed by the Ninth Circuit.
140
  The Supreme Court granted certiorari and 
reversed the court of appeals.
141
 
The Court explained that the Ninth Circuit extended protection against 
retaliation under the opposition clause to individuals who not only complain 
about practices that are actually unlawful under Title VII, but also to those 
who complain about practices an employee could reasonably believe are 
unlawful.
142
  The Court did not rule on the propriety of that interpretation, 
but it held that even if extending protection to employees holding a 
reasonable belief about the unlawfulness of an action was a proper 
interpretation of Title VII, Plaintiff failed to meet that standard.
143
  The 
Court examined Plaintiff’s claim in light of the Court’s precedent on hostile 
work environment claims.
144
  A plaintiff succeeds in a hostile work 
environment claim by showing the challenged conduct resulted in a 
workplace permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult 
that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of the 
plaintiff’s employment.
145
  Whether a work environment is sufficiently 
abusive for an actionable hostile work environment claim to arise is 
                                                          
 133.  Id. at 269. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. at 269–70. 
 139.  Id. at 270.  
 140.  Id. at 271. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. at 270. 
 143.  See id. 
 144.  See id. at 270–71. 
 145.  See id. at 270 (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998)). 
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determined by considering the totality of the circumstances, including the 
frequency of the conduct; its severity; and whether it is physically 
threatening or humiliating as opposed to a mere offensive utterance.
146
  
“Teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely 
serious)” are typically not actionable discrimination.
147
  The Plaintiff in 
Breeden acknowledged that she was not offended by the statement in the file 
and that it was part of her job to read sexually explicit statements.
148
  
Considering the substantive law, the Court held that no reasonable person 




The conduct challenged in Breeden clearly did not rise to the level of an 
actionable hostile work environment claim under the case law governing 
such claims.  Whether, however, the Plaintiff might have reasonably 
believed the comment violated the law is another matter.  In holding that the 
Plaintiff might have reasonably believed the challenged conduct was 
unlawful, the Ninth Circuit did not ignore the case law of sexual harassment.  
It did, however, “make[] allowance for the limited knowledge possessed by 
most Title VII plaintiffs about the factual and legal bases of their claims.”
150
  
The court also relied on the fact that before complaining, Plaintiff consulted 
the school district’s regulations concerning sexual harassment, which was 
described as including “uninvited sexual teasing, jokes, remarks, and 
questions.”
151
  In support of her reasonableness argument, the Plaintiff 
pointed to those regulations in her opposition brief before the Supreme 
Court,
152
 which failed to address the argument in its short opinion.  Why it 
failed to do so is peculiar because the employer’s policies were part of the 
circumstances Plaintiff considered in her understanding of sexual 
harassment law.  The regulations were a tangible factor for the Court to 
consider in assessing reasonableness.  It is unclear why any lay employee 
reading the same information would not have thought that sexual jokes 
constituted unlawful sexual harassment. 
After Breeden, courts universally adopted reasonableness as the 
standard for determining when a belief about unlawful employment 
                                                          
 146.  See id. at 270–71. 
 147.  Id. at 271 (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788). 
 148.  Id.  
 149.  Id.  
 150.  Breeden v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 99-15522, 2000 WL 991821, at *1 (9th Cir. July 19, 
2000) (internal quotations omitted), rev’d, 532 U.S. 268 (2001). 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  See Brief in Opposition, Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 232 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2000), 
(No. 00-866), 2001 WL 476883, at *17. 
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discrimination is protected.
153
  Similar to the approach the Court took in 
Breeden, many courts solely use the facts known to the plaintiff and existing 
case law in applying the standard.  This section examines troubling concerns 
with this approach to the reasonableness issue.  It demonstrates that the 
approach raises the same concerns that gave rise to the reasonable belief 
doctrine. 
C. The Trouble with Being Reasonable 
1. Adopts a Summary Judgment Standard 
Although retaliation protection does not require employees to actually 
prove that a challenged practice is actually unlawful, as Deborah Brake and 
Joanna Grossman note, the reasonable belief doctrine “comes perilously 
close to the standard for surviving summary judgment on the underlying 
discrimination claim.”
154
  Under the standard, plaintiffs must possess a 
mastery of Title VII case law, and in some cases, must know the law as 
interpreted by a particular court.  Holding employees to such an exacting 
standard before protecting them from retaliation has the potential to deter 
complaints, undermining the informal resolution of claims and avoidance of 
harm principles that gave rise to the reasonable belief standard. 
To appreciate how the reasonable belief standard may deter complaints, 
it is important to understand the stringency with which some courts have 
applied it.  A few examples demonstrate this point.  In George v. Leavitt,
155
 
the D.C. Circuit rejected hostile work environment and retaliation claims of 
Plaintiff, a black woman from Trinidad and Tobago, who alleged that “[o]n 
different occasions,” she was told to “go back to Trinidad or to go back to 
where [she] came from.”
156
  On other occasions, Plaintiff, an engineer, was 
told “she should never have been hired, and . . . to shut up.”
157
  The court 
affirmed judgment against her on the hostile work environment claim, 
indicating that no reasonable jury could conclude she satisfied the standard 
                                                          
 153.  See Rosenthal, supra note 20, at 1135–39 (explaining that prior to Breeden, the Tenth 
Circuit consistently used a good faith standard for determining protected opposition, but that after 
Breeden it joined those courts that require plaintiffs also to harbor an objective, reasonable belief 
about the unlawfulness of a challenged practice).   
 154.  Brake & Grossman, supra note 14, at 916.  See also id. at 928 (“An employee who 
complains of perceived discrimination without sufficient factual or legal support to withstand 
summary judgment on a legal challenge to the underlying discrimination may have no legal recourse 
for the retaliation that follows.”). 
 155.  407 F.3d 405 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 156.  Id. at 407–08. 
 157.  Id. at 408.  
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for a hostile work environment.
158
  The court also held that in light of 
existing substantive law, she could not have reasonably believed her 
working environment was sufficiently abusive to constitute a hostile work 
environment.
159
  The court gave no indication how many times Plaintiff 
should have been told to go back to Trinidad in order for her to reasonably 
believe she was being discriminated against because of her national origin.  
It also did not discuss whether Plaintiff’s belief might have been bolstered 
by being told to shut up and questioning why she was even hired.  The court 
appears to have affirmed judgment on the reasonable belief issue for the 
same reason it did on the underlying claim: a “reasonable jury” would have 
been unable to find in her favor.
160
 
In Hart v. Community Group, Inc., a district court dismissed a complaint 
alleging retaliation after concluding that the plaintiff could not have 
reasonably believed a coworker’s sexual joke was discriminatory.
161
  At a 
social, where ice cream was being served, the Plaintiff’s male coworker said 
to her, “you look like you know what you are doing with that whipped 
cream.  You look like you use that all the time.”
162
  Plaintiff reported the 
comment and was fired several days later.
163
  The court concluded that the 
single offensive statement did not satisfy the standard for an actionable 
hostile work environment claim, which is undoubtedly true considering case 
law on the matter.
164
  Relying on circuit precedent, the court also dismissed 
her retaliation claim.  It held that the case did not involve “difficult questions 
regarding the interpretation or application of the law.”
165
  The court’s view 
that hostile work environment claims do not involve complex questions 




In Butler v. Alabama Department of Transportation,
167
 the Eleventh 
Circuit reversed a jury verdict in favor of an African-American plaintiff who 
                                                          
 158.  Id. at 416–17. 
 159.  Id. at 417.  
 160.  See id. (explaining that plaintiff could not have reasonably believed the conduct about 
which she complained was discriminatory). 
 161.  No. 3:08-CV-175, 2008 WL 1924031, at *1 (E.D. Va. Apr. 28, 2008). 
 162.  Id.  
 163.  Id.  
 164.  Id. at *3. 
 165.  Id.  Moreover, the court explained that her belief regarding harassment may have been 
reasonable, pursuant to circuit precedent, had she alleged facts showing that her employer had put in 
place a plan to create a hostile work environment, even though the plan had not yet been fully 
implemented.  Id. 
 166.  See supra note 51 and accompanying discussion. 
 167.  536 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 2008). 
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alleged that several adverse actions were taken against her after she reported 
that a white coworker had used racist language in her presence.  Plaintiff and 
her coworker, Karen Stacey, who was white, were going to lunch together 
when Stacey’s vehicle collided with another vehicle driven by an African-
American man.
168
  Stacey turned to Plaintiff and asked: “Did you see that 
stupid mother fucking nigger hit me?”
169
  She later added, “Look at . . . that 
stupid ass nigger down there [] trying to direct traffic.”
170
  Plaintiff 
attempted to report this behavior to her immediate supervisor, who told her 
he did not want to hear it.
171
  However, after the supervisor learned of the 
behavior, Plaintiff suffered several adverse actions, including having 
previously approved leave revoked.
172
  A jury determined that her employer 
in fact had retaliated against her.
173
  The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding 
that based on the substantive law, her allegations did not come “near enough 
to create a racially hostile environment.”
174
  How close she needed to come 
for her belief to be reasonable was left unclear. 
While the underlying incidents described in the aforementioned 
decisions may not have actually violated Title VII under existing law, the 
point of the reasonable belief doctrine is that plaintiffs should not have to 
make that showing and should receive some measure of protection even 
when they are wrong on the merits.
175
  Moreover, other than citing the 
standard for hostile work environment claims, which undoubtedly is a high 
bar, none of these decisions explained how close to an actual violation the 
plaintiffs had to come in order for their belief about discrimination to be 
reasonable.  Under the case-law litmus test approach, as suggested earlier, 
plaintiffs will be protected if they are able to show sufficient facts to survive 
an employer’s motion for summary judgment on the underlying claim.
176
  
                                                          
 168.  Id. at 1210. 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Id. at 1210–11. 
 172.  See id. at 1211 (adverse actions also included “a letter of reprimand based on her failure to 
correctly complete a training form” and a “‘letter of written counsel’ regarding excessive 
absenteeism”).  
 173.  Id. at 1212. 
 174.  Id. at 1214. 
 175.  See Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1978) (rejecting a 
literal interpretation of the statute and explaining that employees should not have to resort to the 
EEOC “to bring complaints of discrimination to the attention of the employer with some measure of 
protection”). 
 176.  To survive an employer’s motion for summary judgment, an employee would have to show 
there is a dispute of material fact such that summary judgment in the employer’s favor would be 
improper.  See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986) (explaining that summary 
judgment is proper if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
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This would permit a trier of fact to find the challenged practice was actually 
unlawful under substantive law.
177
  Requiring employees to make such a 
showing defeats the purpose of the reasonable belief standard.  The standard 
recognizes that it would deter plaintiffs from opposing perceived 
discrimination if they must first be sure about the unlawfulness of a 
challenged practice to safely bring a complaint.  A standard approximating 




These decisions highlight an additional problem with the case-law 
litmus test approach to testing reasonableness—the standard advances what 
Professor Deborah Brake has called a “court-centered” approach to 
understanding reasonableness.
179
  To that end, the standard fails to recognize 
that minorities and women often hold different perceptions from others 
about whether a practice is discriminatory.
180
  While Congress left it to the 
courts to determine when discrimination occurs, this does not mean that it 
intended courts to ignore the validity of perceptions concerning 
discrimination other than the court’s own.  Adopting a court-centered view 
of whether an event may reasonably be perceived as discrimination is a 
choice the courts are making that too often favors employers rather than the 
employees Title VII is designed to protect. 
                                                                                                                       
 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”  (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c))).  Under this standard, 
materiality is judged by the substantive law.  Id. at 248.  Only facts that make a difference to the 
outcome of the case are material.  Id.  Thus, under the standard, the facts must be assessed in light of 
existing law to determine if they are material.  Id.  Under the case-law litmus test, it appears that 
plaintiffs are being held to this standard on the underlying claim. 
 177.  See id. at 248 (explaining that summary judgment is inappropriate “if the evidence is such 
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party”). 
 178.  See Brake & Grossman, supra note 14, at 929 (“[M]any courts effectively equate a 
reasonable belief in unlawful discrimination with the actuality of unlawful discrimination.”). 
 179.  Professor Deborah Brake has argued that the reasonable belief doctrine not only adopts a 
“court-centered approach” to assessing reasonableness, but that courts have used the standard to 
“enforce a narrow understanding of discrimination and silence alternative perspectives.”  See 
Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 89, 98–102 (2005). 
 180.  See Gorod, supra note 20, at 1495–96 (referencing studies that show that women and men 
view sexual harassment differently; “women have a broader, more inclusive definition of sexual 
harassment and are more likely than men to view mild social sexual behavior as sexual 
harassment”).  The Ninth Circuit also has recognized that women and men may have different 
understandings of what constitutes sexually harassing behavior, and, as a result, has adopted a 
reasonable woman standard for assessing reasonableness in the context of hostile work environment 
claims.  See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991). See also infra notes 236–44 and 
accompanying discussion; Terry Smith, Everyday Indignities: Race, Retaliation, and the Promise of 
Title VII, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 529, 565–66 (2003) (noting that studies show that 
“minorities are considerably more likely to perceive an event as discriminatory than are whites”).   
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2. Ignores Tangible Factors that Weigh on Reasonableness 
The case-law litmus test is also troubling because it fails to take into 
account tangible factors that undisputedly weigh into the employee’s 
decision to voice concerns about possible discrimination.  In Breeden, for 
instance, while the complained-of conduct clearly did not satisfy the 
standard for an actionable harassment claim as interpreted by the Court, 
Plaintiff never claimed to consult that authority, and it is quite reasonable to 
believe that few employees would do so.  She did, however, consult her 
employer’s policies regarding harassment, which included sexual joking as a 
form of sexual harassment.  The Court failed to consider that factor in 
evaluating reasonableness. 
The Fourth Circuit took a similar approach in Jordan v. Alternative 
Resources Corp.
181
  There, an African-American plaintiff alleged he was 
terminated after reporting to management a racist remark made by a white 
coworker.
182
  Both men were in a company office watching a news report of 
the arrest of two black men, who were suspected of engaging in a killing 
spree.  Plaintiff’s coworker stated that “They should put those two black 
monkeys in a cage with a bunch of black apes and let the apes f—k them.”
183
  
Plaintiff reported this remark to management only after learning that his 
coworker had previously made similar racist remarks “many times 
before.”
184
  Plaintiff argued that after he reported his coworker’s remark, he 
should have been protected against retaliation because when he complained, 
he held a good faith, reasonable belief that he was complaining about a 
racially hostile work environment.  The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s judgment in favor of the employer on its motion to dismiss, finding 
that no reasonable person could have believed that the statement, which the 
court labeled “crude” and “racist,” amounted to racial harassment under 
Title VII.
185
  The result in the case seems particularly unfair because the 
employer’s policy manual required employees to report “any conduct that 
the employees perceive to be discriminatory.”
186
  Yet, the court ignored that 
                                                          
 181.  458 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 182. Id. at 336.  Jordan alleged that following his complaints to various management employees, 
his schedule was changed, he was assigned additional work assignments, he suffered derogatory 
comments, and he was ultimately fired.  Id. at 337. 
 183.  Id. at 336. 
 184.  Id. at 347. 
 185.  Id. at 337, 339–40. 
 186.  Jordan v. Alt. Res. Corp., No. Civ.A. DKC 2004–1091, 2005 WL 736610, at*6 (D. Md. 
Mar. 30, 2005).  See also Jordan, 458 F.3d at 350 (King, J., dissenting) (noting that under the 
employer’s policy “employees were obliged to report racially discriminatory conduct to 
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an African American might have perceived comments comparing persons of 
his race to apes to be discriminatory.  Despite the employment manual, 
which may have factored into Plaintiff’s decision to complain, the only 
perception that mattered was that of the court. 
The results in Breeden and Jordan seem particularly unjust considering 
that many employers have employment policies that claim zero tolerance for 
harassment and other forms of discrimination, largely as a result of the 
Ellerth–Faragher affirmative defense.  In response to the affirmative 
defense, many employers have adopted anti-discrimination policies, which 
are now a staple in many employee handbooks and manuals.
187
  These 
policies often proclaim that employees should feel free to report 
discrimination and promise that employees will not be retaliated against for 
doing so.
188
  Yet, when employees report what they perceive to be 
discriminatory conduct in accordance with their employers’ policies, they 
may legally be penalized because they did not correctly understand judicial 
interpretation of Title VII.
189
 
                                                                                                                       
 
management”). 
 187.  See Brake & Grossman, supra note 14, at 884–85 (discussing the trend in recent years, in 
part because of the Ellerth–Faragher affirmative defense, of employers to establish internal 
complaint procedures for reporting perceived discrimination); Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation in an 
EEO World, 89 IND. L.J. 115, 128–30 (2014) (articulating reasons why employers are incentivized to 
adopt internal nondiscrimination policies and complaint procedures); Wendy E. Wunsh, The 
“Seinfeld” Case Tempts Litigation, But Employers Remain “Masters of Their Domain”, 15 LAB. 
LAW. 265, 276–77 (1999) (“[I]t is increasingly common, and somewhat necessary, for employers to 
adopt standards and procedures addressing their anti-harassment and Equal Employment 
Opportunity provisions, and to include such policies in their employee handbooks and policy 
manuals.”). 
 188.  The Society of Human Resources Management (“SHRM”), a membership organization of 
human resources professionals, offers a template of an anti-harassment/discrimination policy on its 
website.  According to its website, SHRM has over 250,000 members who work for companies 
throughout the world, including 575 affiliated chapters within the United States.  SOCIETY FOR 
HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, http://www.shrm.org/about/pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 
11, 2014).  The template suggests that company policies offer to protect individuals from 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, and sex, which are covered by Title VII, as well 
as sexual orientation and marital status, which are not.  SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT, http://www.shrm.org/TemplatesTools/Samples/Policies/Pages/CMS_000551.aspx 
(last visited Mar. 11, 2014).  Moreover, the template directs company policies to “encourage[] 
reporting of all perceived incidents of discrimination or harassment” and provides that the company 
“prohibits retaliation against any individual who reports discrimination or harassment or participates 
in an investigation of such reports.”  Id.; see also Brake, supra note 187, at 132 (explaining that 
“[e]mployer [nondiscrimination] policies and EEOC staff encourage employees to raise their 
concerns through . . . internal channels instead of taking them outside of the organization”).   
 189.  In Jordan, the plaintiff alleged that his employer promulgated anti-harassment policies 
outlining steps for alerting supervisors to workplace harassment and thereby encouraged him to 
report his coworker’s racist comments.  Jordan, 458 F.3d at 347.  The dissent noted that pursuant to 
IBM’s policy Jordan was “obliged to report racially discriminatory conduct to management.”  Id. at 
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3. Requires Expert Knowledge of Title VII, Including Interpretations 
by a Particular Court 
The case-law litmus test is also problematic because employees have 
been required to understand the law as interpreted by a particular court even 
if there is conflicting authority from another court or the EEOC.  Thus, 
retaliation claims have failed under the reasonable belief doctrine although 
authority exists that supports the employee’s belief.  For instance, in Weeks 
v. Harden Manufacturing Corp., the Eleventh Circuit reversed judgment in 
favor of plaintiffs who were fired in retaliation for refusing to sign 
agreements compelling mandatory arbitration of all workplace disputes, 
including any employment discrimination claims.
190
  The court noted that 
other than the Ninth Circuit, most courts had held that such claims were 
subject to compulsory arbitration agreements.
191
  Further, the EEOC had 
adopted a position in accord with that of the Ninth Circuit’s approach.
192
  
The Eleventh Circuit held that considering the weight, although not 
unanimity, of authority on the issue, Plaintiffs could not have reasonably 
believed that compelling them to arbitrate their discrimination claims was 
unlawful.
193
  What is striking about the court’s opinion is that the EEOC—
the agency entrusted with interpretation of Title VII and overseeing its 
administration—held the same view as Plaintiffs about the unlawfulness of 
the practice.
194
  Yet, the court determined that Plaintiffs’ belief about forced 
                                                                                                                       
 
350 (King, J., dissenting).  After doing so, however, he was terminated. 
 190. Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d 1307, 1310–11 (11th Cir. 2002).  There, the 
employer admitted that it terminated the employees for refusing to sign the arbitration provision. 
 191.  Id. at 1312–15. 
 192.  See id. at 1315–16 (noting EEOC policy statement that compulsory arbitration agreements 
may be unenforceable or illegal, but that does not mean requiring employees to sign such an 
agreement violates Title VII). 
 193.   Id. at 1315.  In 1999, when the employees complained of having to sign the arbitration 
provisions in their employee handbook, the Supreme Court had not definitively decided that 
employers could require employees to arbitrate discrimination claims.  See id. at 1310, 1314 
(explaining that plaintiffs protested in 1999 and the Supreme Court reached the issue in 2001 in 
Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001)).  In a decision issued prior to Circuit City, the 
Court had reserved ruling on the exact issue in Weeks, and finally ruled on that issue two years after 
the plaintiffs in Weeks protested their employer’s decision to force them to arbitrate any employment 
dispute.  Thus, when the plaintiffs complained of discrimination, the Court had not decided whether 
compelling arbitration in employment contracts was lawful, and the circuits were split on the issue.  
See generally, Edward A. Marshall, Title VII’s Participation Clause and Circuit City Stores v. 
Adams: Making The Foxes Guardians of the Chickens, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 71, 76–83 
(2003) (discussing the trajectory of the Court’s rulings on arbitration agreements in the employment 
context). 
 194.  Weeks, 291 F.3d at 1315–16. 
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arbitration of Title VII claims was unreasonable.
195
 
In Talanda v. KFC National Management Co., a case that arose under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) which contains an anti-
retaliation provision similar to Title VII’s,
196
 the Seventh Circuit also held 
that the Plaintiff’s belief was unreasonable despite the fact that it was 
supported by the EEOC’s interpretation of the ADA.
197
  In Talanda, Plaintiff 
was fired for refusing to follow an order he belived was discrminiatory.
198
  
His supervisor had asked that he reassign an employee who was missing 
several front teeth from a counter position to a position that would prevent 
customers from seeing her because of her dental issues.
199
  In Plaintiff’s 
subsequent retaliation action, the Seventh Circuit held that he could not have 
had a reasonable belief that the reassignment order violated the ADA.
200
  
However, commenting on this particular decision, Professor Alex Long has 
noted the court reached its holding despite the fact that the EEOC had used a 
virtually identical scenario to demonstrate when an employer unlawfully 




The aforementioned discussion demonstrates that Professor Long is 
correct when he argues that “courts appear to hold an employee to the 
standard of what a reasonable labor and employment attorney would believe, 
rather than what a reasonable employee would believe.”
202
  From hotel 
                                                          
 195.  Id.; see also Bazemore v. Ga. Tech. Auth., No. 1:05-cv-1850-WSD-WEJ, 2007 WL 
917280 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 23, 2007) (black, male plaintiff could not have reasonably believed that he 
had been the victim of discrimination considering Eleventh Circuit law, which required the plaintiff 
to show that he and his coworker were “similarly situated in all relevant respects” because even if 
the plaintiff and his coworker had engaged in similar conduct for which he alone was fired, he failed 
to provide information showing their past performance and disciplinary history were “nearly 
identical”). 
 196.  Talanda v. KFC Nat’l Mgmt. Co., 140 F.3d 1090, 1095 (7th Cir. 1998) (explaining that 
because the ADA and Title VII are similarly worded, Title VII decisions would serve as useful 
guidance in interpreting the ADA). 
 197.  Id. at 1097–98 & n. 13.  
 198.  Id. at 1092–94. 
 199.  Id. at 1092–93. 
 200.  See id. at 1097. 
 201.  Long, supra note 15, at 955.  The EEOC’s Interpretive Guidance states that an employer 
regards an individual as having a disability when the individual has an impairment (such as a 
disfigurement or anatomical loss) that is substantially limiting only because of the attitudes of others 
toward the condition.  See 29 C.F.R. § 1630(g)(iii).  In Talanda, the plaintiff argued that he 
reasonably believed that by refusing his supervisor’s order he was opposing unlawful discrimination 
against his subordinate, “an individual who, because of her severe facial disfigurement, . . . was 
regarded by [his employer] as having an impairment that constitutes a disability under the ADA.”  
Talanda, 140 F.3d at 1096.   
 202.  Long, supra note 15, at 955. 
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concierge to Wal-Mart cashier, nurse, doctor, or lawyer, the same case-law 
litmus test standard applies, despite the fact that it is more likely than not 
that most persons in these disparate professions are unfamiliar with Title VII 
case law, let alone the law in particular circuit courts. 
Considering that the reasonable belief doctrine was created to provide 
broad protection from retaliation, but, for many of the reasons discussed 
above, has failed to live up to that promise, it is unsurprising that 
commentators have called for its demise in favor of a subjective good faith 
standard.  While understandable, the position is likely impractical 
considering recent Supreme Court authority interpreting Title VII.  The 
following section explores that authority, which weighs against complete 
abandonment of all objective criteria in determining the scope of protection 
under the anti-retaliation provision. 
IV. MODIFYING REASONABLENESS 
A. The Good Faith Alternative 
To quell concerns about the objective reasonableness standard, 
commentators have argued in favor of rejecting it and using a purely 
subjective, good faith standard in its place.
203
  That standard would likely 
provide employees greater protection against retaliation than the purely 
objective standard.  The standard is judicially administrable as demonstrated 
by the fact that some courts used it pre-Breeden, and its application did not 
appear to raise concerns.
204
  Under a good faith, honesty-in-fact standard, 
protection may be lost if the facts demonstrate that the plaintiff was 
motivated by factors other than challenging perceived discrimination.  
Moreover, such factors as the plaintiff’s education, history of filing frivolous 
complaints, if any, and credibility for honesty as determined by a court or 
jury might also be relevant.
205
 
A good faith standard also better effectuates the goals of the opposition 
clause than the case-law litmus test.  The latter standard all but encourages 
employees to seek the expert advice of counsel before they oppose perceived 
                                                          
 203.   See Gorod, supra note 20, at 1474 (arguing that court should reject reasonableness and 
adopt a good faith standard); Rosenthal, supra note 20, at 1130.   
 204.  See supra notes 128–29 and accompanying discussion. 
 205.  Professor Rosenthal proposes the following test that might be used to demonstrate good 
faith: “(1) the employee’s testimony, (2) her actions taken in response to the allegedly unlawful 
conduct, (3) the timing between the allegedly unlawful conduct and when the employee reported it, 
(4) the employee’s education, and (5) to whom the employee reported the conduct.”  Rosenthal, 
supra note 20, at 1169 n.263. 
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discrimination.  Congress could not have intended that employees possess 
expert knowledge of case law and more specifically the law of a particular 
circuit court before daring to challenge suspected discrimination informally. 
A good faith standard also would be no more inconsistent with the 
language of the provision than a reasonableness standard.  Assuming the 
opposition clause requires an employee to complain about practices that are 
actually unlawful, then protecting an employee for holding either a 
reasonable or good faith belief that discrimination has occurred deviates 
from that interpretation. 
Another reason to reject the reasonable belief standard in favor of a 
good faith standard is because the reasonable belief standard yields 
inconsistent results.  For instance, as evidenced in such cases as Hart, 
Butler, and Jordan, discussed previously, many courts have held that no 
reasonable person could believe that one incident of blatant racist or sexually 
inappropriate conduct constitutes a hostile work environment.  Other courts, 
however, have held to the contrary.
206
  Protection from retaliation should not 
depend on the court in which an employee is fortunate enough to have her 
claim heard.  A good faith standard would go far to remedy instances of 
inconsistent results in factually similar cases.
207
  Thus, I agree with other 
commentators that the subjective good faith standard is preferable to the 
objective reasonableness standard.  However, as a predictive matter, such a 
standard is unlikely to find favor with the Court because it is arguably 
inconsistent with recent authority interpreting Title VII’s anti-retaliation 
provision. 
                                                          
 206.  For instance, in Greene v. MPW Indus. Servs., Inc., a plaintiff alleged that he was fired 
after reporting that a coworker had made a comment about “nigger rigging equipment.”  No. 06-647, 
2006 WL 3308577, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2006).  The plaintiff was not even sure of the precise 
wording of the comment.  Id. at *1 n.2.  The plaintiff did not allege that the comment was made in 
his presence, to him or about him.  Id.  Rather, he heard from someone else that another coworker 
made the remark.  Id.  Relying on the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Jordan, the employer argued that 
the plaintiff could not have held a reasonable belief that this single comment constituted a hostile 
work environment.  Id. at *3.  The district court disagreed.  The court believed that the rule set forth 
in Jordan would require an employee to sit back and wait until harassment has become severe or 
pervasive before bringing it to an employer’s attention, an approach the court opined was at odds 
with the Court’s Burlington Northern decision, which granted expansive protection against 
retaliation so that employees felt free to bring their grievances forward.  Id.  While the court did not 
go so far as to conclude that a complaint about “any behavior” would warrant protection from 
retaliation, it found that the “nigger rigging” comment “was unquestionably the type [of comment] 
of which racially hostile work environments are made.”  Id. 
 207.  See Rosenthal, supra note 20, at 1169–76 (arguing that a good faith standard would 
eliminate the inconsistent results that arise under the reasonable belief doctrine, and examining cases 
in which courts, contrary to the court in Jordan, held that a plaintiff’s reasonable belief regarding 
whether an event was discriminatory could be based on a single incident). 
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B. A Preference for Objective Standards 
As explained earlier, in Burlington Northern, the Court addressed 
whether the term “discriminate against” used in the anti-retaliation provision 
confines itself to activity that affects the terms and conditions of 
employment or reaches more broadly to include adverse actions that do not 
directly implicate the employment relationship.
208
  After determining that 
protection under that clause swept more broadly, the Court then addressed 
how harmful an adverse action had to be to fall within the scope of the 
provision’s protection.
209
  The Court adopted a standard of material 
adversity, i.e., the challenged action must be harmful enough that “it might 
well have dissuaded a reasonable person” from engaging in protected 
activity.
210
  The Court adopted the standard because “[i]t avoids the 
uncertainties of unfair discrepancies that can plague a judicial effort to 
determine a plaintiff’s unusual subjective feelings.”
211
  The Court also noted 
that it has “emphasized the need for objective standards in other Title VII 
contexts.”
212
  It is noteworthy that the Court adopted this standard after 
discussing at length the need for broad protection from retaliation.
213
  Yet, it 
held that the provision only protects individuals from harms that are material 
                                                          
 208.  Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006). 
 209.  Id. 
 210.  Id. at 67–68. 
 211.  Id. at 68–69.  Of course, the good faith standard is judicially administrable as well.  Prior to 
Breeden, courts used the standard and it posed none of the problems the Court seemed concerned 
about in Burlington Northern.  See, e.g., Love v. Re/Max of Am., Inc., 738 F.2d 383, 386 (10th Cir. 
1984) (plaintiff believed in good faith that defendant discriminated against her by paying her less 
than male employees).  However, consistent with its approach in Burlington Northern, the Court 
may well opt to impose a more stringent requirement than good faith.  In that regard, it is worth 
noting that for several years prior to Burlington Northern, the Ninth Circuit applied a standard to 
assess harm under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision that was arguably less stringent than the 
material adversity standard; yet the Court ultimately chose not to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s standard 
for the reasons explained in the text of this article.  See Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 60–61, 67–68 
(rejecting Ninth Circuit’s test); see also Sillars v. Nev., 385 F. App’x 669, 671 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(noting that under circuit precedent prior to Burlington Northern, a lateral transfer might have 
constituted an adverse employment action for purposes of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision but 
that Burlington Northern clarified that an adverse action had to meet a materiality standard; 
plaintiff’s transfer was not materially adverse as she failed to allege the “position to which she was 
moved differed in any material way from the position she occupied prior to her complaints”).  But 
see Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1241–43, 1241 n.4 (9th Cir. 2000) (adopting standard (pre-
Burlington Northern) that would protect employees if an adverse action “is based on a retaliatory 
motive and is reasonably likely to deter the charging party or others from engaging in protected 
activity” and noting that a job transfer even if did not result in a change in pay might constitute an 
adverse action for purposes of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision).  
 212.  See Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 68–69 (noting that it had used an objective standard 
in harassment and constructive discharge cases).   
 213.  Id. at 63–66. 
  
798 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
or significant.
214
  The upshot is that while protection from retaliation is 




The dividing line between the “material” or “significant” harm the Court 
held is actionable and the “trivial harm” the Court indicated is not was left 
unclear.  However, “context matters.”
216
  Whether a particular act satisfies 
the material adversity standard will depend on the particular circumstances 
of each case.
217
  According to the Court, whether an act is materially adverse 
can only be determined by considering the “constellation of surrounding 
circumstances, expectations, and relationships” at play in a given 
situation.
218
  The Court provided a couple of examples to demonstrate when 
the standard may be met.  For instance, it explained that typically a schedule 
change may matter little to an employee, but may matter a great deal to a 
young mother with school age children.
219
  Similarly, a supervisor’s refusal 
to invite a subordinate to lunch is a petty, non-actionable slight.  However, if 
that lunch is part of a weekly training program that contributes significantly 




Burlington Northern highlights several points relevant to the present 
discussion.  It recognizes the need for broad protection from retaliation for 
effective enforcement of Title VII.
221
  Despite that need, the decision also 
demonstrates the Court’s continued preference for objective standards, even 
in the context of retaliation.
222
  Finally, the Court indicates that although it is 
an objective standard, material adversity should be analyzed through the lens 
of the plaintiff’s particular circumstances.
223
  For instance, while a particular 
adverse action may not be actionable when taken against a reasonable person 
in the abstract, that result may be different when the victim is a mother with 
young children.
224
  Thus, even under an objective standard, the facts of the 
                                                          
 214.  See id. at 68 (“We speak of material adversity because we believe it is important to 
separate significant from trivial harms.”). 
 215.  See id. (explaining that in the context of hostile work environment claims, Title VII does 
not protect against “sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes and occasional teasing” 
(quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (2006))).  
 216.  Id. at 69. 
 217.  Id. 
 218.  Id. 
 219.  Id. 
 220.  Id. 
 221.  Id. at 63–66. 
 222.  Id. at 68–69. 
 223.  Id. at 69. 
 224.  Id.  
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case as seen from the plaintiff’s unique perspective are relevant.
225
 
Regarding the opposition clause, while a purely subjective standard 
would provide broader protection from retaliation than the reasonable belief 
standard, it is doubtful that the Court would take the former approach were it 
to decide the issue.
226
  There is no reason to assume the Court would grant 
broader protection to employees regarding a belief that discrimination exists 
than it has regarding whether a plaintiff has been sufficiently harmed after 
complaining about discrimination—the issue in Burlington Northern.  The 
Court demonstrated in Burlington Northern a continued preference for 
objective standards, albeit with a nuanced, circumstances-based approach.  
The remainder of this Article proceeds under the assumption that the current 
law favors a similar approach when determining the scope of protection 
under the opposition clause. 
C.  A Totality of the Circumstances Approach 
If the Court opts for a reasonableness standard under the opposition 
clause,
227
 this article proposes a totality of the circumstances test—i.e., 
whether a reasonable person in plaintiff’s position considering all the 
circumstances would believe the complained-of act was unlawful 
discrimination.  In many instances, courts now purport to consider “all the 
circumstances” when assessing reasonable belief, but, as set forth 
previously, the statement is often shorthand for the case-law litmus test: the 
underlying facts regarding the alleged discrimination and the established 
case law.
228
  No limits are proposed under this standard for what 
circumstances may be relevant in a particular case, but there are three factors 
that generally should be considered: (1) the fundamental characteristics of 
                                                          
 225.  Id. 
 226.  Indeed, one of the proponents of the good faith standard concedes that the Court is 
“unlikely to adopt” the standard in light of the Court’s rationale for adopting a reasonableness 
standard in Burlington Northern.  See Rosenthal, supra note 20, at 1169 n.263.  See also Brake, 
supra note 187, at 168 (explaining that it is “likely too late to convince the Court to abandon an 
objective reasonableness requirement under the opposition clause in favor of a subjective good-faith 
standard” but recommending that employer policies defining discrimination be used in determining 
whether an employee’s belief about discrimination is reasonable).   
 227.  Considering the language and purposes of the participation clause, it is less likely—but still 
possible—that the Court could impose a reasonableness standard under the participation clause as 
well.  See discussion supra Part III.A.  If it does so, this discussion would apply to that clause as 
well. 
 228.  See, e.g., Jordan v. Alt. Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 340–41 (4th Cir. 2006) (explaining that 
an employee asserting a hostile work environment claim must show a fear of retaliation that is an 
“objectively reasonable belief in light of all the circumstances” in order to satisfy the objectivity test 
for the claim). 
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the plaintiff (whether a woman, African-American, or a member of some 
other protected group) that may affect perception concerning the 
discriminatory conduct; (2) internal employer policies that interpret or in 
many instances reinterpret the law of employment discrimination, promise 
zero tolerance for discrimination, or urge employees to promptly report 
discrimination when they perceive it; and (3) lack of unanimity among 
judicial or administrative authorities on whether a particular practice violates 
Title VII. 
Moreover, consistent with Burlington Northern, these factors should be 
assessed through the lens of a lay employee unversed in Title VII.  Context 
mattered in Burlington Northern.
229
  It should also matter when assessing 
reasonableness.  It makes little sense to hold cashiers and bank tellers to the 
same standard as labor and employment attorneys regarding precise 
understandings of judicial interpretations of Title VII.
230
 
1. The Reasonable Victim Standard 
A totality of the circumstances approach is not unheard of in 
employment discrimination.  In Burlington Northern, for instance, the Court 
held that whether an act is materially adverse will depend on a “constellation 
of surrounding circumstances.”
231
  The Court drew support for the standard 
from its hostile work environment cases.
232
  To be actionable in this context, 
a plaintiff must show a work environment that is “sufficiently severe or 
pervasive” to alter the terms and conditions of employment and create an 
abusive or hostile work environment.
233
  Whether the work environment is 
sufficiently abusive or hostile is determined by looking at the totality of the 
circumstances.
234
  To constitute actionable harassment, the workplace must 
                                                          
 229.  See Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68 (explaining that context matters in assessing whether the 
“reasonable employee” would find a particular act harmful). 
 230.  Courts in the Ninth Circuit apply a similar standard.  When assessing reasonableness, 
allowance is given for an employee’s “lack of legal knowledge.”  Whitley v. Portland, 654 F. Supp. 
2d 1194, 1215 (D. Or. 2009) (citation omitted). 
 231.  Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 69 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 
U.S. 75, 82 (1998)). 
 232.  See id. (citing Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81–82). 
 233.  See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, 
FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986)) (providing threshold requirements for hostile work 
environment claim and explaining that mere insults do not alter the terms of employment). 
 234.  See id. at 23 (“Whether an environment is ‘hostile’ or ‘abusive’ can be determined only by 
looking at all the circumstances.”).  See also Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270–
71 (2001) (listing a variety of circumstances, such as threats or frequency of alleged discriminatory 
acts, that factor into hostile work environment claims). 
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be both subjectively and objectively abusive; that is, the plaintiff must 
honestly believe the workplace was abusive and a reasonable person would 
have found the workplace abusive as well.
235
 
With regard to the objective prong, courts at one time universally used 
an abstract reasonable person test.
236
  In 1991, in Ellison v. Brady, the Ninth 
Circuit adopted a reasonable woman standard to analyze hostile work 
environment claims.
237
  Thus, the inquiry was not whether a reasonable 
person in the abstract would find the work environment sufficiently hostile 
or abusive, but whether a reasonable woman would find the work 
environment sufficiently hostile or abusive.
238
  In adopting the standard, the 
Ninth Circuit recognized that most victims of sexual harassment are women, 
and that women’s experience with harassment and perception of what 
constitutes sexual harassment differs from that of men.
239
  The court noted 
that in many situations where women had been harassed, men had not 
perceived any harassment and saw the conduct as harmless social 
interaction.
240
  A sex-blind reasonable person standard tends to take on the 
perspective of the male harasser and ignores these experiences unique to 
women.
241
  Thus, the reasonable woman standard considers a “victim” rather 
than a “perpetrator” perspective of discrimination. 
The court acknowledged that not all women think alike, but nevertheless 
they may share certain concerns and experiences that are not shared by most 
men.
242
  For instance, most men do not experience rape or sexual assault, 
                                                          
 235.  See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21–22 (clarifying that the plaintiff must meet both an objective and 
subjective test to establish hostility). 
 236.  See Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 548, 582 (2001) (explaining that the reasonable person standard required courts to 
examine the victim’s viewpoint and perspective).   
 237.  924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (using the reasonable woman standard to establish a 
prima facie case of a hostile work environment). 
 238.  See id. at 879–80 (explaining that the reasonable person standard must be interpreted from 
a reasonable woman’s viewpoint when a female employee brings a sexual discrimination claim). 
 239.  See id. at 879 (explaining that the current reasonable person interpretation “tends to 
systematically ignore the experiences of women”). 
 240.  See id. at 878–79 (noting that men may not consider conduct offensive despite women 
being offended). 
 241.  See id. at 879 (showing how men view sexual harassment in a vacuum, while women may 
see conduct as a string of advances that could culminate in sexual assault).  According to the court, 
adopting the standard “does not establish a higher level of protection for women than men.”  Id.  
Rather, taking into account gender consciousness allows women to participate on equal footing with 
men in the workplace by ensuring that “neither men nor women will have to run the gauntlet of 
sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living.”  Id. (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 242.  See id. (“We realize that there is a broad range of viewpoints among women as a group, but 
we believe that many women share common concerns which men do not necessarily share.”). 
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and thus their perceptions of the risk of sexual harassment morphing into a 
sexual assault is low compared to the perception of many women, which 
may affect how women respond to perceived harassment.
243
 
Although two years after Ellison, the Supreme Court in Harris v. 
Forklift Systems, Inc.
244
 used a reasonable person test to analyze the 
objective prong of a hostile work environment claim, the Court did not 
explicitly reject the reasonable woman test.
245
  Moreover, the Court later 
reiterated a requirement for objective reasonableness in Oncale v. 
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,
246
 but emphasized that reasonableness 
must be determined from the viewpoint of the reasonable person in the 
plaintiff’s position, giving careful consideration to “the social context in 
which particular behavior occurs and is experienced by its target.”
247
  As 
explained previously, the Court adopted a similar standard in the context of 
retaliation under the material adversity standard.  That standard supports 
viewing reasonableness from the viewpoint of the victim.
248
 
The Ninth Circuit later extended its holding in Ellison to a reasonable 
victim standard—or the reasonable person with the same fundamental 
characteristic as the plaintiff.
249
  Other courts have also used the reasonable 
victim standard in harassment cases.  Indeed, courts have used the standard 
despite the Supreme Court’s emphasis on using “objective standards” in 
areas of employment discrimination.
250
  Applying that standard in the 
                                                          
 243.  See id. (“Women who are victims of mild forms of sexual harassment may understandably 
worry whether a harasser’s conduct is merely a prelude to violent sexual assault.  Men, who are 
rarely victims of sexual assault, may view sexual conduct in a vacuum without a full appreciation of 
the social setting or the underlying threat of violence that a woman may perceive.”). 
 244.  510 U.S. 17 (1993). 
 245.  See id. at 21–22 (highlighting the importance of evaluating the employee’s subjective belief 
that discriminatory acts occurred, but maintaining a general reasonable person standard by not 
labeling it a reasonable woman standard).  See also Juliano & Schwab, supra note 236, at 582 
(“Despite the Court’s use of the “reasonable person” standard, it did not explicitly reject the 
‘reasonable woman’ test.” (citation omitted)). 
 246.  See 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (viewing the “objective severity of harassment” through the 
subjective perception of a reasonable person in the employee’s situation).  
 247.  Id.  Professor Terry Smith has argued that “[t]he Court’s willingness to consider social 
context” in Oncale “may foretell a willingness to consider the uniqueness of race,” or the perspective 
of the victim, “in relation to opposition conduct.”  Smith, supra note 180, at 558.  
 248.  See supra notes 218–225 and accompanying text. 
 249.  See, e.g., Woods v. Champion Chevrolet, 35 F. App’x 453, 456 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Whether 
the workplace is objectively abusive is evaluated ‘from the perspective of a reasonable person with 
the same fundamental characteristics’ as the plaintiff.” (quoting Fuller v. Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 
1527 (9th Cir. 1995))). 
 250.  See, e.g., EEOC v. Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., 621 F.3d 991, 1000 (9th Cir. 2010) (using 
reasonable victim standard in hostile work environment claim); Stephenson v. Philadelphia, 293 F. 
App’x 123, 124 (3d Cir. 2008) (applying reasonable woman standard). 
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context of retaliation, the inquiry would be whether a reasonable person with 
the same fundamental characteristic as the plaintiff (woman, African-




Judge King, who dissented in Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp.,
252
 
applied the reasonable victim approach, which, had it been used by the 
majority, may have yielded a different result in that case.  In Jordan,
253
 as 
discussed earlier, the Plaintiff alleged he was retaliated against after 
reporting that a coworker had referred to African Americans as black 
monkeys and had allegedly made similar comments previously.
254
  Judge 
King believed that the black monkeys comment, coupled with similar racist 
comments made previously by the same individual, could have led Jordan 
reasonably to believe that African-American employees had been or were in 
the process of being exposed to a racially charged hostile work 
environment.
255
  As to the black monkeys comment, Judge King believed the 
majority gave it too little weight in its analysis.
256
  According to Judge King, 
referring to African Americans as monkeys reflects a deep hostility toward 
that group on the basis of color.
257
  Such comments, he argued, “constitute[] 
profound insults to our friends in the African-American community.”
258
  
Further, referring to African Americans as monkeys plays on historic, 
                                                          
 251.  Brianne Gorod has argued against adopting the reasonable woman standard in the context 
of retaliation claims.  See Gorod, supra note 20, at 1497 (explaining that one solution to the 
reasonable person standard might be to adopt a reasonable woman standard but questioning whether 
such a standard would be an effective solution: “A ‘reasonable woman’ standard is hardly more 
concrete than any other ‘reasonableness’ standard, and it is unlikely that the courts will find it any 
easier to apply”).  These concerns aside, as explained in the main text, a reasonable woman or victim 
standard might offer broader protection from retaliation than would a purely objective standard.  
Moreover, this article proposes a totality of the circumstances approach that would consider more 
than just the reasonable victim perspective.  While any reasonableness standard has its drawbacks, 
the totality of the circumstances approach advocated here, where the victim’s perspective is merely 
one factor, might expand protection against retaliation more than merely adopting a reasonable 
victim versus a reasonable person standard alone would.   
 252.  458 F.3d 332, 349 (4th Cir. 2006) (King, J., dissenting). 
 253.  Id. 
 254.  See id. at 337 (noting that coworker said African Americans were monkeys that should be 
put in cages). 
 255.  See id. at 352–53 (finding the fact that Jordan’s coworker made black monkeys comment as 
well as similar comments in the past according to other employees led Jordan to reasonably believe 
that “African-American workers at IBM’s facility were regularly exposed to conduct akin to the 
‘black monkeys’ comment, and that such conduct would continue unless [Jordan’s coworker] was 
confronted”). 
 256.  See id. at 350 (“To begin with, the severity of Farjah’s racially hostile ‘black monkeys’ 
comment merits our consideration.”). 
 257.  See id. (noting that color was the sole basis for the hostile remark). 
 258.  Id. 
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bigoted stereotypes that have characterized them as “uncivilized, non-human 
creatures who are intellectually and culturally inferior to whites.”
259
  Judge 
King stated that although a panel of white male judges must try to do so, it 
“is scarcely qualified to comprehend the impact such a remark would have 
on the reasonable African-American listener.”
260
  Judge King therefore 
strived to consider the comment from the perspective of the reasonable 
victim, here an African-American plaintiff, and, based on his analysis, King 




The propriety of adopting the reasonable victim standard has been the 
subject of much scholarly debate.
262
  However, the reasonable victim 
                                                          
 259.  Id. at 351. 
 260.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 261.  Courts using the reasonable victim standard have routinely found that such an individual 
might perceive a single incident or comment to be unlawful, particularly considering the person’s 
unfamiliarity with the law.  See Whitley v. Portland, 654 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1213–15 (D. Or. 2009) 
(reasonable woman could find that single comment made about her clothing and breast violate Title 
VII, giving due allowance for the lack of legal knowledge; rejecting argument that a single incident 
could never be considered unlawful harassment because it would mean that a plaintiff would either 
have to undergo a serious incident such as rape or have an in-depth knowledge of harassment law to 
be protected against retaliation for complaining about harassment); Figueroa v. Paychex, Inc., No. 
CIV. 99-797-ST, 1999 WL 717349, at *11–12 (D. Or. 1999) (applying Ninth Circuit law to state 
statute, which protects against discrimination on the basis of marital status, and finding that 
unmarried plaintiff could have found that single comment calling her child a “bastard child” was 
unlawful discrimination considering lack of legal knowledge).  In addition, there is also a study that 
suggests that the reasonable victim standard may provide broader support than a reasonable person 
standard for plaintiffs alleging retaliation.  In a study released in 2001, Professors Ann Juliano and 
Stewart J. Schwab examined every reported federal district and appellate court opinion between 
1986 and 1995 (650 total), which among other things, identified broad trends in the harassment 
decisions.  See Juliano & Schwab, supra note 236, at 551–52.  One factor the authors considered was 
the number of times courts analyzed hostile work environment claims under a reasonable woman 
standard.  See id.  The authors acknowledged that there had been much debate among commentators 
about the propriety of adopting the reasonable woman versus the reasonable person standard.  The 
authors “found more articles discussing the reasonable woman standard than courts adopting” it.  Id. 
at 584.  The authors noted that many commentators criticized the reasonable person standard as 
contrary to the intent of Title VII, while others argued that a reasonable victim standard “is contrary 
to the principle of equality or that it is unfair to hold men to an unclear standard.”  Id. at 583.  Of the 
courts that used the standard, however, plaintiffs had a higher success rate than in cases where courts 
referred only to the reasonable person.  See id. at 583–84.  The authors warned, however, that 
“[f]ewer than one-quarter of the district court cases mentioned any ‘reasonable[ness] standard’ at 
all.”  Id. at 584.  Thus, “[g]iven how few cases mentioned the reasonable standard at all, the specific 
‘reasonable’ standard used is not statistically significant in predicting win rates.”  Id. at 585.  The 
authors still noted that the interplay between reasonableness and cases in which plaintiffs lost 
painted “an interesting story.”  See id.  Of the twenty-seven cases in which courts held that 
“plaintiffs should not reasonably [have been] affected by the [challenged] conduct, courts discussed 
the reasonable person test in eighteen cases and the reasonable woman standard in a mere three 
cases.”  Id. 
 262.  See Juliano & Schwab, supra note 236, at 583 & nn.140–41 (citing articles setting forth 
debate regarding the propriety of using the reasonable woman versus the reasonable person 
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standard is preferable to the purely abstract reasonable person approach 
because it takes into account the experiences of people of color, women, and 
other protected groups, which may affect how individual members of these 
groups perceive discrimination and react to it.
263
 
2.  Employer Representations about the Scope of the Law 
It goes without saying that most employees are unfamiliar with the 
intricacies of employment discrimination law as handed down by courts.  
However, in many cases employees are held to a case-law litmus test 
standard—and in some cases they must be familiar with the law of a 
particular circuit.
264
  The Eleventh Circuit has explained that the 
reasonableness of employees’ beliefs must be based on substantive 
knowledge of the law because, otherwise, “the reasonableness inquiry 
becomes no more than speculation regarding their subjective knowledge.”
265
  
That is not necessarily so.  Many tangible factors may influence employee 
understanding of the law,
266
 including employer policies that often explain 
harassment or other discrimination law and set forth an employee’s duties to 
report it. 
Despite the case-law litmus test standard, judicial interpretation of Title 
VII and particularly hostile work environment claims do not stand alone in 
giving meaning to what the statute proscribes.  That interpretation is often 
re-interpreted in the policy manuals of many organizations.  Because of the 
two-part Ellerth–Faragher affirmative defense, many employers incorporate 
anti-harassment policies in their employment handbooks and manuals.
267
  
Further, as explained below, employees are held responsible for knowing 
                                                                                                                       
 
standard). 
 263.  Employees should be able to rely on anecdotal and expert testimony to show that particular 
conduct might cause a reasonable employee of the same race or sex to perceive that conduct as 
discriminatory.  Professor Terry Smith has argued for allowing African-American employees to use 
similar proof as a means to justify the particular method of opposition the employee engaged in to 
respond to perceived discrimination.  See Smith, supra note 180, at 566 (arguing that black 
employees should be able to rely on anecdotal or expert testimony to show that “the totality of the 
employee’s experience with his employer [would] cause a reasonable employee of the same race to 
behave” in the same way the employee behaved to oppose perceived discriminatory conduct). 
 264.  See supra Part III.C.3. 
 265.  Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1388 n.2 (1998). 
 266.  For instance, one commentator has noted that “employees’ understandings of what 
constitutes harassment [may] be shaped in large part by media accounts . . . to the extent that the 
media paints a broader picture of sexual harassment, the general public may begin to accept that 
belief.”  Gorod, supra note 20, at 1494. 
 267.  See supra notes 187–89 and accompanying discussion. 
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and following any procedures set forth in these policies to report 
discrimination.  Thus, looking beyond judicial decisions to ascertain 
employee understanding of the law does not necessarily become an exercise 
in speculation. 
There is some evidence that harassment policies are prevalent among 
businesses and that such policies may more broadly define unlawful conduct 
than the Supreme Court.  As explained previously, the Court has held that a 
hostile work environment claim is viable only if there is conduct that is 
severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of employment and create 
an abusive work environment.
268
  “Teasing, offhand comments, and isolated 
incidents (unless extremely serious)” generally will not meet that 
standard.
269
  Despite the Court’s attempt to exclude certain conduct from the 
definition of actionable harassment, such exclusion may be missing from 
employer polices. 
Vicki Schultz has noted that because of Ellerth and Faragher, American 
companies have been pressured by legal experts to “go beyond the dictates 
of the law to curtail broad forms of sexual conduct—including conduct that 
does not satisfy the legal definition of sexual harassment . . . in order to 
avoid liability for sexual harassment.”
270
  Surveys suggest that an 
overwhelming majority of companies have policies that prohibit sexual 
harassment and “reach broadly to forbid many forms of potentially harmless 
sexual conduct without demanding inquiry into the surrounding factors that 
would determine legal liability.”
271
  Professor Schultz further cites one study 
that invited human resources professionals to relate the primary types of 
harassment alleged in complaints received by their companies.
272
  One of the 
                                                          
 268.  See supra Part IV.C.1.  See also Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270 
(2001) (citing previous decisions which held that the discrimination must be so “severe or pervasive” 
that it “create[s] an abusive working environment”). 
 269.  Breeden, 532 U.S. at 271.  In Breeden, for instance, the plaintiff complained about a single 
incident that occurred when she, her supervisor and coworker were reviewing files that contained 
sexually explicit material.  Her supervisor said he did not know what the statement in one of the 
reports meant, and the coworker said he would explain it to him later and both men chuckled.  Id. at 
269.  The Court described this conduct as “at worst an ‘isolated inciden[t]’ that cannot remotely be 
considered ‘extremely serious,’ as our cases require.”  Id. at 271. 
 270.  Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2090 (2003).  Professor 
Schultz describes an American Bar Association Journal article that warns companies to establish 
sexual harassment policies that bar employees from making “sexual jokes” or innuendoes or 
engaging in office romance.  See id. at 2091.  The article quotes one ABA official who proclaims 
that “suggestive joking of any kind simply must not be tolerated.”  Id. at 2092. 
 271.  Id. at 2095. 
 272.  See id. at 2095–96.  The study was conducted by the Society for Human Resource 
Management, “the leading organization of professionals responsible for designing and implementing 
sexual harassment policies.”  Id. at 2096. 
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most prevalent forms of harassment reported was “sexual jokes, remarks and 
teasing,”
273
 conduct the Court has determined does not typically satisfy the 
standards set forth in its harassment decisions.  According to Professor 
Schultz, this survey demonstrates that “many employees now conceive of 




Another commentator also has explained that the prevalence of sexual 
harassment and efforts to thwart it have resulted in much writing aimed at 
helping women to spot it when they see it.  Moreover, because of that 
advice, 
[m]any employers now have sexual harassment materials that warn 
employees against any teasing or flirting behavior in the workplace.  
While the fineness of the line between the legal and the illegal makes it 
sensible for such material to warn against any potentially inappropriate 
behavior, it may cause individuals to believe that any such conduct is 
not only inappropriate, but also illegal.  Thus, employees . . . will be 
tempted to report such behavior the very first time it occurs, despite the 
fact that an isolated incident of such conduct is only rarely sufficient to 
establish a “hostile work environment.”
275
 
Although these commentators have focused principally on sexual 
harassment policies, employers may also have policies that address 
harassment or discrimination more broadly on other bases, including race or 
religion, which are also protected by Title VII.  In Jordan, for instance, the 
plaintiff alleged that his employer’s policy manual “required” employees to 
report “any conduct that employees perceive to be discriminatory,” 
including “racially discriminatory conduct.”
276
  How the employer defines 
discrimination should factor into whether an employee reasonably believes 
he would be protected for his report.
277
  Recognizing as much, some courts 
                                                          
 273.  These forms of activity “were the primary types of harassment alleged in nearly half (48 
percent) of the 1,214 sexual harassment complaints.”  Id. at 2096 (emphasis added).  Professor 
Schultz states that in her research she reviewed “numerous sex harassment policies adopted by 
companies or proposed by experts” and “most prohibit a broad range of sexual conduct that would 
not necessarily be legally actionable.”  Id. at 2098. 
 274.  Id. at 2096. 
 275.  Gorod, supra note 20, at 1491–92. 
 276.  First Amended Complaint for Relief from Unlawful Discharge at 3, Jordan v. Alt. Res. 
Corp., No. Civ.A. DKC 2004–1091,  2005 WL 736610 (D. Md. Mar. 30, 2005).  See also Jordan v. 
Alt. Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 350 (4th Cir. 2006) (King, J., dissenting) (noting that under the 
employer’s policy “employees were obliged to report racially discriminatory conduct to 
management”). 
 277.  See Brake, supra note 187, at 168 (explaining that it is “likely too late to convince the 
Court to abandon an objective reasonableness requirement under the opposition clause in favor of a 
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have considered employer policies as probative when determining whether 
an employee acted reasonably in complaining about conduct perceived as 
discriminatory.
278
  The case-law litmus test takes the opposite approach.
279
 
It is also noteworthy that while some courts fail to consider employer 
policies for purposes of assessing an employee’s belief about unlawful 
activity, they have little trouble holding employees responsible for knowing 
and following reporting procedures set forth in those same policies.  Under 
prong two of the Ellerth–Faragher affirmative defense, an employer may 
prevail on the affirmative defense if it can show employees failed to take 
advantage of the employer’s preventative or corrective opportunities 
(typically set forth in the same policies that define harassment), or to avoid 
harm otherwise.
280
  Plaintiffs are often held to have fallen short under prong 
two because they failed to use the exact procedure for reporting set forth in 
the employer’s policy or delayed too long in reporting discrimination despite 
the policy.
281
  Accordingly, courts have no problem holding employees 
accountable for the contents of these policies when employees allegedly do 
not follow the detailed protocol for reporting harassment; yet, some courts 
take the opposite approach when considering what an employee perceives to 
be unlawful based on these exact policies.
282
  In sum, the totality of the 
                                                                                                                       
 
subjective good-faith standard” but recommending that employer policies defining discrimination be 
used in determining whether an employee’s belief about discrimination is reasonable).  Policies will 
differ from company to company and thus what may be reasonable in one instance may not be in 
another depending on the content of the policy.  However, that is the product of a reasonableness 
inquiry where all the circumstances are considered. 
 278.  See, e.g., Watson v. Sutton, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 2739(KMV), 2005 WL 2170659, at *10 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2005) (finding that evidence at trial supported finding that plaintiff had a 
reasonable belief that complaining about an “an inappropriate sexual comment” was protected 
activity).  Among other things, employer’s policy stated that “[s]lurs and certain jokes or attempts at 
humor are inappropriate and may be actionable”).  Id. at *7. 
 279.  See supra Part III.C.2 and accompanying notes. 
 280.  For instance, in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, the Court explained that “[w]hile proof 
that an employer had promulgated an anti-harassment policy with a complaint procedure is not 
necessary in every instance as a matter of law, the need for a stated policy suitable to the 
employment circumstances may appropriately be addressed in any case when litigating the first 
element of the defense.”  524 U.S. 775, 778 (1998).  Further, “proof that an employee failed to fulfill 
the corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to showing an 
unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the employer, a demonstration of 
such failure will normally suffice to satisfy the employer’s burden under the second element of the 
defense.”  Id. 
 281.  See Matthew W. Green Jr., Express Yourself: Striking a Balance Between Silence and 
Active, Purposive Opposition under Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision, 28 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. 
L.J. 107, 147–49 & nn.241–55 (2010) (raising this point and citing cases and literature discussing 
reasons that plaintiffs fall short under prong two of the affirmative defense). 
 282.  See supra Part III.C.2. 
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circumstances in assessing reasonableness should take into account 
employer representations defining discriminatory conduct and when to 
report it. 
3. Lack of Unanimity Among Judicial or Administrative Authorities 
Regarding Whether a Particular Practice Violates Title VII 
Another circumstance that should be considered in the reasonableness 
inquiry is whether there is any legal support for the plaintiff’s belief that a 
practice is unlawful under Title VII, regardless of whether that support is 
found in the circuit in which the case arises, another court, dissenting 
opinions, or EEOC guidance.  Thus, conflicts in the law should be 
considered as a circumstance in the reasonableness determination, and the 
benefit of the doubt should be given to the plaintiff where conflicts exist. 
Under the reasonable belief standard, some courts have required that the 
plaintiff show an objectively reasonable belief about the illegality of a 
practice as determined by existing circuit precedent.
283
  However, that 
conflicting authority exists regarding the legality of a practice should 
necessarily mean that a lay employee’s belief that aligns with any of those 
conflicting positions is reasonable.  Indeed, one court applying the 
reasonable belief doctrine recognized as much.  In Berg v. La Crosse Cooler 
Co.,
284
 an early case applying the reasonable belief doctrine, the plaintiff, a 
personnel clerk, was terminated after she opposed her employer’s decision to 
deny temporary disability leave to another employee for reasons related to 
pregnancy.
285
  Plaintiff alleged that she based her opinion on a seminar she 
attended where she was informed that under state law an employer offering 
comprehensive disability benefits to employees could not lawfully exclude 
from coverage compensation for the inability to work due to pregnancy.
286
  
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer on the 
plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim because after the plaintiff’s termination, 
the Supreme Court in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert
287
 held that employers 
                                                          
 283.  See supra Part III.C.3. 
 284.  612 F.2d 1041 (7th Cir. 1980). 
 285.  Id. at 1041–42. 
 286.  Id. at 1042. 
 287.  429 U.S. 125 (1976).  Congress later abrogated Gilbert by amending Title VII to define 
discrimination on the basis of sex to include “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.”  
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006).  See Berg, 612 F.2d at 1044 (“As a result of this legislation and 
inasmuch as it is an unlawful employment practice to discriminate against any of his employees 
‘because of sex,’ under present law the defendant’s temporary disability benefits program . . . would 
constitute an unlawful employment practice.”). 
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that excluded disability benefits for pregnancy in otherwise comprehensive 
disability plans did not discriminate against women on the basis of sex.
288
  
The Seventh Circuit reversed.
289
  It noted that at the time the plaintiff lodged 
her complaint, six courts of appeals and the EEOC had addressed the issue 
and had agreed with the position taken by the plaintiff.
290
  Moreover, 
[e]ven at the time that Gilbert was decided, the plaintiff here was in 
distinguished intellectual company in maintaining her belief that the 
defendant’s program was an unlawful employment practice.  Justices 
Brennan, Marshall and Stevens [in dissent in Gilbert] concluded that 
the language of the statute, motive, administrative expertise [of the 




As Berg suggests, a plaintiff’s belief about the lawfulness of an 
employment practice cannot be considered unreasonable if the same position 
is taken by jurists, even if that view is not held by a majority of jurists.  Berg 
also shows that a plaintiff’s belief may be reasonably shaped by 
interpretations of state statutes analogous to Title VII.
292
  States typically 
have their own anti-discrimination statutes, which are often but not always 
interpreted similarly to Title VII.
293
  At times, as in Berg, however, state 
courts may interpret their statutes to provide broader coverage from 
discrimination than federal courts provide under Title VII.
294
  Moreover, 
                                                          
 288.  Berg, 612 F.2d at 1043. 
 289.  Id. at 1047. 
 290.  Id. at 1043. 
 291.  Id. at 1044. 
 292.  Harkening back to an earlier point, Berg also demonstrates the importance of perspective in 
assessing reasonableness.  As one commentator has noted, the decision is a “textbook example[] of 
the effects of . . . insensitivity . . . ‘[i]magine what the presence of even one woman Justice would 
have meant to the Court’s conferences’” in determining whether discrimination on the basis of sex 
includes discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.  Stephanie S. Gold, An Equality Approach to 
Wrongful Birth Statutes, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1005, 1024 & n.105 (1996) (citing Kenneth L. Karst, 
The Supreme Court 1976 Term, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 54 n.304 (1977)). 
 293.  Compare Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., Inc., 879 F.2d 1304, 1310 (6th Cir. 
1989) (applying same standard to a claim brought pursuant to a Michigan anti-discrimination statute 
that would apply under Title VII), and Dias v. Goodman Mfg. Co., 214 S.W.3d 672, 677 (Tex. App. 
2007) (adopting interpretation of Title VII for purposes of similarly worded state anti-discrimination 
statute), with Alexander v. Seton Hall Univ., 8 A.3d 198, 205–06 (N.J. 2010) (rejecting the Court’s 
analysis of pay discrimination claim arising under Title VII that arose under similarly worded state 
anti-discrimination statute). 
 294.  Berg dealt with a plaintiff who based her belief that her employer’s policy toward pregnant 
women was unlawful on a Wisconsin Supreme Court decision declaring it unlawful under the 
Wisconsin Fair Employment Law.  Berg, 612 F.2d at 1045 (citing Ray-O-Vac, Div. of E.S.B., Inc. v. 
Wisconsin Dep’t of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 236 N.W.2d 209, 216 (Wis. 1975). 
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employer anti-discrimination policies may fail to distinguish between federal 
and state law when setting forth prohibited discriminatory practices.  In 
those instances, employees may reasonably conclude that the policy applies 
to both federal and state law.
295
 
The EEOC’s position on an issue also should be taken into account in 
assessing reasonableness.  The Court has found the EEOC’s interpretation of 
the statute to be persuasive and has adopted its interpretation in many 
instances.
296
  Moreover, the agency is the entity Congress charged with 
administration of the statute, and the Court has explained that its 
pronouncements regarding Title VII may be “properly” consulted by courts 
and litigants for guidance.
297
  Accordingly, it would seem odd if an 
employee’s belief aligned with the EEOC’s position regarding the 
unlawfulness of a particular practice but the employee’s belief was 
considered unreasonable.  If the reasonableness of the employee’s belief 
must be assessed, at least in part, by “substantive law,”
298
 the fact that there 
is some authority that supports the belief should satisfy any requirement that 




                                                          
 295.  The Society for Human Resources Management, for instance, recommends that company 
anti-discrimination policies state that employees are protected from discrimination on the basis of 
“any . . . characteristic protected by law.”  See SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT, 
http://www.shrm.org/TemplatesTools/Samples/Policies/Pages/CMS_000551.aspx (last visited Mar. 
11, 2014).  There is no recommendation that the policy distinguish the traits that are protected by 
federal law from those that are protected by state law.  Moreover, it recommends that companies 
protect individuals on the basis of characteristics that are clearly not protected by Title VII, such as 
marital status and sexual orientation.  See id. 
 296.  See, e.g., Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 65 (2006) (citing 
EEOC Compliance Manual for the proposition that the anti-retaliation provision should provide 
“exceptionally broad protection” to those challenging discrimination); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 
519 U.S. 337, 345–46 (1997) (holding that Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision protects former 
employees as well as current employees, which is the EEOC’s position as set forth in its Compliance 
Manual; Court found persuasive EEOC’s argument that a contrary position would undermine Title 
VII’s purposes); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1971) (holding that intelligence 
tests are authorized under Title VII if they are job-related and relying on EEOC guidelines for 
support on the matter: “[t]he administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency is 
entitled to great deference”). 
 297.  See Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co., 429 U.S. 125, 141–42 (1976) (EEOC interpretations of Title 
VII are not controlling on courts but do “constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to 
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance”). 
 298.  See Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d 1307, 1317 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that 
plaintiffs may not disclaim knowledge of substantive law for purposes of the reasonableness inquiry 
lest “the reasonableness inquiry becomes no more than speculation regarding their subjective 
knowledge”). 
 299.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2014). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Courts recognized early on that it would undermine Title VII’s 
objectives to protect employees from retaliation under the opposition clause 
only on condition that they possess an expertise in the law and an aptitude 
for predicting the outcomes of Title VII cases.  Thus, the reasonable belief 
doctrine was adopted and was deemed necessary to effectuate the statute’s 
goals.  Somewhere along the way, the noble purpose of the doctrine was 
lost. 
It may be true that determining reasonableness requires some objective 
benchmarks.  Considering the bases for the reasonable belief doctrine, 
however, those benchmarks should not begin and end at case law, which 
most lay employees do not know and indeed are not expected to know.  If 
employees were expected to know the law and appreciate its intricacies, 
including circuit splits, the original purpose behind the creation of the 
reasonable belief doctrine would be thwarted.  Thus, the case-law litmus test 
for determining reasonableness should be discarded. 
Despite its flaws, however, the reasonable belief doctrine, in some form, 
is unlikely to be replaced by a purely subjective good faith standard.  The 
approach proposed here—the totality of the circumstances test—occupies 
the middle ground between purely objective and purely subjective standards.  
It should provide greater protection against retaliation than does the narrow 
case-law approach, and better effectuate the original goals of the reasonable 
belief doctrine.  The totality of the circumstances test would be a step, even 
if a small one, toward making the rhetoric of broad protection from 
retaliation a reality. 
 
